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SUMMARY 
The Surf Clam Subboard of the Northeast Marine 
Fisheries Board asked for alternative management schemes 
which would protect the surf clam resource and the industry 
which depends upon it. In our view this dual goal can be 
attained only by a scheme which embodies some form of 
limited entry or property rights to the resource in 
addition to provisions which are resource-oriented. 
Our choice of a suitable management program is 
a catch rights scheme. Second choice is a limitation on 
catching capacity and third choice is licensing a limited 
number of vessels. The catch rights program seems signifi-
cantly superior to the others. There follows a brief 
presentation of alternative management schemes, the 
jurisdictional and legal basis for management, and 
alternative manageiment regimes. 
Alternate Management Schemes 
The catch rights scheme involves subdivision of 
an annual catch quota (MSY or other number) into a large 
number of Catch Rights units which would be issued to 
the industry, probably by a formula recognizing past 
performance, as licenses to catch an established quantity 
of clams. Catch Rights would become items of property 
being salable under stipulated conditions. The catch 
rights approach is effective in protecting the resource 
and in protecting the economic v:lability of the industry. 
2. 
The benefits of the measure are incident on holders of 
catch rights. It allows a maximum of flexibility to 
industry in decid:ing how, when and where to harvest 
their catch. It does not preclude modifications to 
improve or refine the utilization of the resource. It 
is not prohibitiv4ely expensive to implement, monitor and 
enforce. There appear to be no insurmountable legal 
problems. 
The othier two schemes are similar in concept but 
differ in details, one focusing on the vessel, the other 
on the effectiven,ess of the fishing unit. As in the 
case with Catch Rights, licenses would be issued under 
some "grandfathering" formula. They could be salable 
items of property or the property rights could be retained 
by the management authority. Both alternative schemes 
would limit the total catch and limit entry into the 
fishery by placing a limit on the number of licenses issued. 
Licenses would entitle the holder to operate (in one 
scheme) a certain defined category of vessel or (in the 
other option) a certain number of complexly defined catch 
capacity units. Benefits of limited entry under either 
scheme would accrue to the industry. Administration and 
enforcement would be cumbersome. Legal questions, though 
perhaps more complex than in the catch rights scheme, 
do not appear insurmountable. 
Each of the basic management schemes is amenable 
to refinement by incorporation of resource oriented 
provisions such as size limits to maximize yield per 
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recruit, and area closures to prevent harvest of small 
rapidly growing clams, or to provide a spawning sanctuary. 
We prefer the catch capacity scheme to the vessel 
scheme because of its greater flexibility. It can better 
accommodate changing status of the resource and industry 
and can be more readily adjusted to allow for technological 
advances. FurthE~rmore, if property rights are assigned, the 
catch capacity scheme provides for smaller, cheaper units 
and thus a. larger market. 
Jurisdiction 
The surf clam resource falls under the juris-
diction of several states and the federal government. 
Although the present management framework is a blend 
of the old and the new, the key to understanding 
present state and federal roles in fishery management 
is the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. 
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
of 1976 (FCMA) created a fishery conservation zone (FCZ) 
for waters 197 nautical miles beyond the seaward boundary 
of each of the coastal states of the United States. 
FCMA became effective on March 1, 1977 and vests in the 
United States exclusive management authority over all 
fish within the fishery conservation zone, and all 
continental shelf fishery resources beyond the FCZ, as 
well as providing for United States jurisdiction over 
anadromous species except when they enter waters under 
the jurisdiction of other nations. At the international 
level, no claims of sovereignty in the waters in this 
zone are made and no interference with recognized 
legitimate uses of the high seas, except as are necessary 
to implement fishery management and conservation, are 
authorized by the Act. The states retain most of their 
traditional rights in relation to fishery regulation 
under the new Act. 
4 
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State jurisdiction over fisheries is recognized 
in conunon law principles, court decision, and both state 
and federal legislation. State jurisdiction has been 
recognized to extend not only to internal and territorial 
waters of a state but also to include State vessels and 
citizens on the high seas operating beyond state territorial 
waters. Through landing regulation states have also acted 
to control non-resident fishing activities. It must be 
remembered that such state authority has been and will 
continue to be subject to the exercise of certain paramount 
federal powers. 
Under FCMA state authority over internal waters 
is reserved completely to the states while state authority 
over territorial waters is reserved to the states subject 
to certain exceptions. State jurisdiction over its 
vessels and citizens beyond territorial waters remain 
possible only if there is no conflict with regulations 
within the FCA. State control over non~resident~ recently 
an issue before the United States Supreme Court, is also 
questionable undE~r FCMA. The portion of FCMA, p_ertinent 
to state jurisdiction is Section 306 and it states: 
(a) In General. --Except as provided in sub-
section (b), nothing in this Act shall be construed 
as extending or diminishing the jurisdiction or 
authority of any State within its boundaries. 
No State may directly or indirectly regulate 
any fishing which is engaged in by any fishing 
vessel outside its boundaries, unless such 
vessel is registered under the laws of such State. 
(b) Exception.--(1) If the Secretary finds ••. 
that--
6 
(A) the fishing in a fishery, which 
is covered by a fishery management plan 
implemented under this Act, is engaged in 
predominantly within the fishery conserva-
tion zone and beyond such zone; and 
(B) any State has taken any action, 
or omitted to take any action, the results 
of which will substantially and adversely 
affect the carrying out of such fishery 
management plan; 
the Secretary shall promptly notify such State and 
the appropriate Council of such finding and of his 
intention to regulate the applicable fishery within 
the boundaries of such State (other than its 
internal waters), pursuant to such fishery manage-
ment plan and the regulations promulgated to 
implement such plan. 
(2) If the sneretary ... finds that the 
reasons for which he assumed such regulation no 
longer prevail, he shall promptly terminate such 
regulation. 
The Act reaffirms the right of a state to regulate 
fishing even beyond its territorial waters where its own 
citizens or vessels are involved. However, the FCMA also 
seems to limit a state's control beyond the three mile waters 
to these instances and circumstances alone. By forbidding 
a state to "directly or indirectly" regulate fishing beyond 
its boundaries, excepting the above two instances, the FCMA 
renders state regulation aimed at nonresidents and 
effected through landing laws dubious in validity. 
Furthermore, if federal regu'lation in the conserva-
tion zone is exercised, even permissible extended state 
regulation which conflicted with it would have to yield 
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Even 
without conflict, federal regulation in a particular area 
might pre-empt exercise of state power in the same area. 
The surf clam is one of the enumerated fisheries 
subject to the conservation and management provisions of 
the FCMA. Power granted under the FCMA will be used to 
regulate the surf clam fishery beyond state territorial 
waters within the conservation zone. Whether federal 
power will be used even within state waters as provided 
by Section 306 (b) remains to be seen. Certainly the 
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FCMA has laid the groundwork for a vigorous federal program 
of fishery management. 
Leg a 1 Bas is for Managemer!:.!. 
Under FCMA it is possible for state and federal 
management authority to coexist. It is also clear to most 
observers that any effective scheme for the management 
and conservation of fisheries resources must include 
limiting the amount of fishing effort. Therefore, it is 
imperative to consider the legal implications of such a 
management policy under state and federal law before 
attempting to formulate or implement any specific plan. 
In establishing any limited entry program, free 
access to the resource will be restricted. This creates 
the possibility that persons who were previously taking 
as much of the resource as they desired might challenge 
the program. Their challenge would most likely rest on 
due process and/or equal protection grounds under the 
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, 
and on any similar provisions of state constitutions. It 
is important, therefore, to examine due process and equal 
protection standards in order to be able to satisfy 
constitutional r1equirements in formulating a program. 
The Constitutional standards of due process 
equal protection are not mathematical formulas which 
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can be applied to a statute to give a positive yes or no 
answer regarding its validity. They are flexible measures 
of the limits of state regulation over individual activity. 
On the basis of past decisions it appears that the federal 
courts would uphold a reasonable, non-discriminatory 
limited entry scheme. Economic and conservation regula-
tions in the public interest are valid areas of state 
concern. To help assure that a.n act is upheld, any limited 
entry scheme should be supported by the best available 
biological and economic data proving that such regula-
tion is necessary and in the public interest. Careful 
drafting of the scheme to assure that similarly situated 
individuals are treated alike will also help sustain the 
program from constitutional attack. 
A potential legal problem that must not be over-
looked in evaluating the legal viability of any management 
scheme is that many of the decisions supportive of marine 
resource management have been couched in terms of biological 
justification. And, although the biology and economics of 
a fishery are closely intertwined,economic justifications 
for management have not been given the same weight or 
consideration as have biological factors. Although 
promoting sound ,economic management of a fishery has been 
held to be a legitimate purpose for state regulation, the 
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legal precedent is much less extensive than for biological 
regulation. If a truly enlightened management posture is 
to be achieved, there must be wider recognition of the 
fact that management is not solely for the sake of resource 
itself, but management is for the benefit of people--the 
economics of the fishery and the benefits to the people 
go hand-in-hand. 
In addition to the Constitution of the United 
States and the Fishery Cunservation and Management Act of 
1976, the laws of Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia are 
analyzed. Constitutional, statutory, or regulatory language 
is often subject to differing interpretations. As a 
practical matter:, the limiting factor in many cases may 
be interpretation and implementation at the management 
level. For thesE~ reasons it is important for state 
management authorities and their legal advisors to review 
their own statutes, reguJations, and administrative customs 
in order to determine what scope of management authority 
exists within the statutory framework. Although other 
legal considerations were addressed on a state by state 
basis, the following is a summary of the findings regarding 
the status of limited entry in state law. 
New York 
The New York constitutional standards should not 
bar limited entry. The state ranks preservation of natural 
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resources very highly. The statutory grant of power would 
appear to give the Department of Environmental Conservation 
the authority to limit entry and consider economic factors 
in reg~lating a fishery. 
New Jersey 
The New Jersey constitutional requirement should 
be easily met by a limited entry scheme. The mandate to 
the New Jersey management entity is broad enough to include 
promulgation of regulations for limited entry. The 
present shellfish regulation are statutory, so any limited 
entry program would have to either (1) meet the same 
standards as the existing statutes or (2) include legis-
lative action to amend or repeal the shellfish laws. 
Delaware 
The Delaware Constitution should not bar a 
limited entry scheme. The Commission of Shell Fisheries 
has a broad mandate to regulate the industry, including 
licensing vessels and issuing permits to persons engaged 
in the industry. This authority contains no restrictions 
as to what factors may be considered in setting management 
poli~y. 
Maryland 
· Under due process and equal protection, Maryland 
courts should uphold a limited entry scheme, but care must 
be taken to avoid the anti-monoply term of the Constitution. 
The broad authority given to the Department of Natural 
Resources should include the ability to impose a limited 
entry scheme. 
Virginia 
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The due process and equal protection standards of 
Virginia can be met, as long as the "special laws" standard 
is observed. The state has a constitutional policy of 
resource conservation. The management authority is broad, 
and surf clam management is specifically authorized, so a 
limited entry scheme for surf clams should be acceptable. 
Connecticut 
Connecticut's constitutional law would accept limited 
entry, although the common law tradition of right to work 
will require firm proof that regulation is needed. The 
statutory management scheme is very tight, leaving little 
room for any implied powers. Connecticut would require 
legislation to implemC-"nt limited entry. Since existing 
legislation allows a daily catch limit to be set for oysters, 
limited entry should not be foreign or replusive to the 
Legislature. It would, however, be outside the statutory 
authority of present management agencies to initiate 
such a scheme. 
North Carolina 
The common law supporting the right to work will 
have to be carefully considered in drafting limited entry 
legislation for North Carolina. Before fishermen can be 
excluded, the need for limited entry will have to be 
clearly demonstrated and the allocation scheme will have to 
be carefully developed. However, some precedent exists 
for economic management of fisheries in North Carolina. 
Shrimp seasons, for example, are opened and closed on the 
basis of the commercial size of the shrimp, a factor 
unrelated to biological conservation. The state might be 
willing to accept economic criteria for fishery management. 
In contrast with the state constitutional law, 
the management statutes are quite broad and imply a great 
deal of paver vested in the management agencies. The 
agency can license vessels and clammers, and tax clams 
to the statutory limit. 
12 
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ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS FOR MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT 
AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Many variations exist for development and 
implementation. Because jurisdiction under FCMA exists, 
as a general rule only in the FCZ, a species could be subject 
to a management plan developed and implemented under FCMA 
and also subject to state or interstate plans directed 
at management in tnternal and territorial waters. Manage-
ment programs may be developed and implemented with varying 
opportunities for success, by individual states, by mutual 
agreement among states involved in the fishery, by mutual 
agreement among states and the Federal Government, or by 
the Federal Government alone. Since FCMA does not 
necessarily preclude the existence or development of 
other regulatory mechanisms, various alternatives for 
management development and implementation exists via 
unilateral and intergovernmental mechanisms. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Adopt one of the three schemes or a modification 
thereof. 
B. Develop a detailed management plan including a 
schedule of implementation. The plan and schedule should 
provide for the following: 
1. Development and legal review of an allocation 
(grandfathering) plan for distributing catch rights 
or licenses. 
2. Determination of the property attributes to be 
lodged in catch rights or licenses and the 
mechanisms for issuance, exchange, and for 
recording exchanges. 
3. A schedule of and responsibility for data 
collecting, processing, analysis, interpretation 
and dissE~mination. 
4. A schedule of and responsibility for review and 
revision of the management program. 
5. A schedule of and responsibility for research 
to answer specific questions of managerial 
significance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has long been established that fisheries whose 
products enjoy a strong market tend to overfish the resource 
and to attract fishing capacity in excess of that required 
to take the harv,estable surplus. The surf clam fishery 
exemplifies these unfortunate properties of common property 
fisheries in that the catch has risen from a brief plateau 
of approximately 60 million pounds in the early 70's to 
a peak of 96 million pounds in 1974 and then declined to 
49 million in 1976. At the same time the fleet increased 
from approximately 100 vessels in 1970 to near 150 by the 
end of 1976. 
It is apparent that the harvesting capacity has 
over-reached the reproductive capability of the stock. To 
harvest more from the stock than it is capable of producing 
is both biologically and economically wasteful. However 
nothing inherent in the economics of the industry prevents 
overharvesting. Indeed, the strong market demand for surf 
clams drives the industry toward overharvesting. In the 
absence of property rights or other inherent economic 
controlling mechanism, external governmental control must 
be exerted if the productivi'ty of the resource is to be 
maintained and a climate is to be maintained in which 
businesses can operate with reasonable expectation of 
profit and reasonable predictability of amortization rates. 
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While the need for management is clear, the 
appropriate choice among the large assortment of alterna-
tive management mechanisms is not. Therefore the Surf Clam 
Subcouncil of the: Northeast Marine Fisheries Council asked 
for alternative management schemes which would accomplish 
the goals of protecting the industry which uses it. 1 This 
paper was developed from the report submitted to the Council. 
It was occasioned by the passage of the Fishery Conservation 
and Management Ac:t of 1976 which significantly improves the 
regulatory environment. The modifications to the original 
report are essentially those needed to make it consistent 
with this Act. ·rhe objective o:E the discussion set forth 
in Part I is to eixamine the advantages and disadvantages 
of a few such management schemes. The legal implications 
associated with the development and implementation of 
various management alternatives are addressed in Part II. 
The capital investment required for efficient 
plants and vessels is high in relationship to their 
predictable economic life in an unmanaged fishery. The 
lack of control of the supply of its raw material places 
the surf clam industry in a position of higher risk than 
most other industries. If overfishing occurs plants and 
vessels will become unprofitable before the end of their 
useful life. A management program should provide access 
to the common property resource in a fashion that gives the 
clammingindustry a stability of supply similar to that 
experienced by other, non-seafood industries. That is, 
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the regulations should provide a framework within which 
clamming businesses enjoy approximately the same 
opportunities for success or failure as business outside of 
the seafood industry. History shows that without govern-
mental regulation of harvest, businesses utilizing a corrnnon 
property resourcE~ cannot expect reasonable return on capital 
investment in th,~ long run. Providing greater stability 
of the resource and greater predictability of the extent of 
competition for the resource (and thus a degree of stability 
to investment) is considered to meet the goal of protecting 
the industry. 
The goal of protecting the resource is considered 
to be met by preventing average harvest from exceeding 
average maximum sustainable yield (MSY). 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The names of these two groups subsequently were changed to 
Surf Clam Sub-board and Northeast Marine Fisheries Board 
to reduce thei possibility of confusing them with the 
Regional Management Councils created by the Fisheries 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (PL 94-265). 
PART I 
MANAGEMENT SCHEMES 
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INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most direct and specific type of 
management is "resource-oriented." Examples of this type 
of regulation include closed seasons and areas, minimum 
size regulations, catch limits, and spawning sanctuaries. 
Certain biological requirements, intra-seasonal adjust-
ments, and fine-tuning might be accomplished with various 
resource-oriented regulations, e.g., area closures, size 
limits, etc. Appropriate use of these methods depends on 
an extensive understanding of the biological characteristics 
of the species and is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
However, it is important in applying these techniques to 
consider their complementarity with the entry limitation 
schemes under discussion. For example, while each scheme 
requires as input the total desired annual catch for the 
fishery, the application of aggregate quota regulations 
without effort limitations will elicit the inevitable 
race for clams which could dissipate most of the potential 
economic gains from management. The implications of 
various resource-oriented regulations should be studied 
carefully in conjunction with possible complementary limited 
entry measures. 
While various resource oriented schemes may 
sufficiently protect the resource, some form of 
controlled access is recognized as necessary to accomplish 
the goal of protecting the industry. Controlled access 
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or "limited entry" schemes differ from the resource-related 
schemes in being explicitly cognizant of economic factors 
and therefore can offer substantial economic benefits 
to fishermen. We define limited entry schemes as those 
which directly or indirectly limit the amount of fishing 
effort to some dE~sired level. An assumption of the dis-
cussion which follows is that some form of a limited entry 
scheme is desired. The degree to which benefits would be 
incident on fishE~rmen, the effectiveness, and the cost of 
controlling effort will influence the desirability of 
limited entry measures, and these factors will themselves 
be determined to a considerable extent by the particular 
method employed to limit entry. 
It is clear that one alternative is a continuation 
of a laissez-faire or "do-nothing" policy. The consequences 
of such policy will be dissipation of profits to fishermen; 
that is, the division of a diminishing resource among more 
and more fishermen. The analysis of Gates (1974) clearly 
indicated substantial benefits in excess of $5 million 
annually from limited entry. 1 
Much rE~mains to be learned about the biology, 
especially population dynamics of the surf clam. A funda-
mental question which urgently needs consideration is the 
quality of knowlE~dge necessary to initiate management 
measures. Every additional boat which enters the fishery 
is prolonging the inevitable adjustment process and making 
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it more expensiv,~. At some point a decision must be made 
based on the best available information. The question is, 
will this decision be made before or after stock depletion 
and bankruptcy of many fishermen in the surf clam fishery. 
In the following sections, we outline alternative 
methods of limit:ing entry. Before doing so we wish to repeat 
that limited entry and resource-oriented schemes should be 
complementary rather than competitive instruments of 
management. There are many variations on the theme of 
limited entry but two broad approaches are presented: 
(1) an indirect approach in which property rights in the 
resource are ass:igned to the users so that the users them-
selves determine the level of fishing effort to deploy 
under the influence of the various economic constraints 
affecting the industry (2) a. direct approach in which the 
governmental management agency determines the optimum 
number of units of gear and issues a limited number of 
licenses. In thie second case, property rights may be lodged 
in the licenses, but need not be. In the discussion which 
follows three hypothetical "packages" are presented, one 
indirect scheme, and two direct schemes. They have been 
constructed so as to reduce the disadvantages inherent in the 
individual components of each package. Considering the 
large number of permutations possible, the number of options 
has necessarily been restricted. The following should, 
therefore, be regarded as a framework for discussion and 
not as an exhaustive catalogue. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Gates, J.M. 1974. The Benefits to Fishermen of 
Limited Entry Measures in the Surf Clam Fishery. 
Rhode Island Agricultural Experiment Station 
Contribution number 1538 Kingston, R. I. 
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CATCH RIGHTS 
The elE~ments of a Catch Rights scheme are (1) 
selection of a quota (2) subdivision of quota into a large 
number of Catch Rights units (CR) (3) definition of 
property aspects of CR, (4) issuance of CR (5) regulating 
transfer of CR, if required (6) periodic adjustment of quota. 
Theoretically the quota could be maximum sustain-
able yield, maximum economic efficiency, optimum yield, or 
as a last resort,, an arbitrarily selected number. The 
number of units (sub-divisions of the quota) should be 
large in relation to the number of vessels operating in 
the fishery to facilitate their exchange and to make possible 
the harvest of small quantities for special or local 
markets, such as a seasonal bait market. The operator of 
an efficient stern dredger would need many CR units to 
operate throughout the year. Having each CR represent a 
relatively small proportion of the total quota would also 
increase a vessel operator's flexibility to adjust to 
changes in efficiency or changes in the amount of clams 
that he desires to harvest. 
As an alternative to catch rights whose magni-
tude (in bushels of clams) might change from time to time 
as the population of surf clams fluctuated, we might consider 
two "pools" of rfghts. One pool, considered permanently 
issued, (permanent rights) would be equal to a conservative 
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estimate of the MSY (or other quota). The other pool 
would be held in reserve to adjust for fluctuations in 
the population. In years of great abundance, all of this 
reserve pool of catch rights would be .issued, in years 
of scarcity nonE~ would be, and in most years some intermediate 
number would be issued. 
Thus, periodically the management agency (MA) would 
decide whether or not to issue rights from the reserve 
pool, and if so!, how many. The pressures to issue additional 
reserve rights would be great and a policy for their 
distribution would be needed. One method would be public 
auction. In effect, the winning bidder would be leasing 
a specific amount of reserve catch rights for a specific 
time period. At the end of that time period they would 
revert to the r,~serve pool. Another method would be to 
distribute the reserve rights equally among exisiting 
holders of permanent rights. There are other formulae 
which could be used but these few examples serve to 
illustrate that~ policy would be needed on the distri-
bution of reserve rights. 
Implementation 
Issuance of CR involves two facets, 1) the 
original issuance at the outset of the management program 
and 2) provisions for renewal, transfer and increase or 
retirement. 
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Catch rights could be issued equally to partici-
pants in the fishery as of some stipulated date of record, 
or alternatively, allocated unequally by some formula based 
on historic participation in and dependence on the fishery 
and the cultural, social and economic framework of the 
fishery1. 
Treating equally all persons participating as of 
a certain date is administratively simple, but socially 
questionable in that different levels of "vested interest" 
are treated the same. 
Distribution based on historic participation presents 
the administrative problem of developing an equitable 
formula. Determining what factors should be considered and 
the importance of each would be quite contentious. How 
does a formula treat equitably the long-time participant 
and the one who has just entered the fishery? Are records 
adequate to demonstrate the historic performance of 
those who have been in the fishery? Alaska's recent 
experience in limiting entry demonstrates that a reasonably 
equitable formula for recognizing various aspects of vested 
interest can be developed though the task is not an easy 
one. 
As a starting point, one must decide whether 
the catch rights are to be divided between the processing 
sector and the fishing sector, or be issued only to the 
fishing sector. In either case among the factors to 
be considered in allocating catch rights to individuals 
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would be volume produced by each unit (plant, vessel, 
corporation) and length of time each has been in the 
clamming business (appropriate credit for replacements, 
changes of names, etc.). The greater the fisherman's or 
processor's historical volume, the greater would be his 
percentage share. The same might be true for length of time 
in the industry. These catch rights could be (but need not 
be) issued in return for a fee sufficient to cover 
administrative costs. 
In the harvesting sector one might group all the 
vessels now operating or on the building ways into categories 
according to their performance or performance of similar 
vessels. By multiplying the annual catch of vessels of 
that class by the number of vessels in the class and 
summing for all classes, one would arrive at a total 
catch capacity. Each boat (class) could then be alloted 
as a catch limit (number of CR) a pro rata share of the 
quota, the basis being the ratio of total catch capacity 
to the quota. 
The property rights which are to exist in the 
CR must be determined and defined before issuance. Some 
experience exists in the governmental leasing of mineral 
rights and of land rights (eg. use of publicly-owned 
bottoms for oyster culture)and in limited entry fisheries 
in Alaska, Washington, and a few other states. This 
experience could provide useful guidance. The primary 
question seems to be the extent to which government can 
or should relinquish its stewardship of the resource. 
Decisions must be made about the following questions. 
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1. Shall the CR be freely transferrable by sale 
or lease, or shall there be controls such 
as: transfers only by or through the manage-
ment agency to record all terms; controls to 
prevent speculation, tax on transfers? 
2. Shall CR be deviseable by will, shall they 
pass by entestatE. succession? 
3. Shall CR be subject to tax and if so, which 
taxes,property, income~ estate? 
4. Shall CR be subject to encumbrances by 
creditors? 
5. Are the CR securities under any security 
re,gulations? 
6. Wi.11 the CR be valid as security on a debt? 
7. Shall limitations be placed on the number 
of CR to be held by one person? 
8. Shall special provisions be made for new 
en.try into the fishery? 
After the initial distribution, catch rights 
would be exchangeable via market transactions, thus a 
mechanism for their efficient redistribution would exist. 
Additionally these market transactions would provide 
significant compensatiort (at no cost to the management) 
to anyone wishing to retire from fishing. Adjustments 
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by the MA would be made when necessary through leasing of 
CR or through a scheme for buying them back or by adjusting 
the catch authorized by a CR. 
Analysis 
A catch right (also called stock certificate by 
some authors) in effect is a marketable asset, the value 
of which depends on the magnitude of average profits per 
pound of catch in the harvesting sector, on the size of 
the catch right and on the cost of capital (i.e. the interest 
rate). As discussed by Gates (1974), rough estimates of 
these profits would be 2.7¢/lb. based on MSY regulation 
and 8. 4¢/lb. basE~d on MEE regulation. .An examination of 
historical data indicates annual gross revenues per vessel 
of $155 thousand in 1976 versus $88 thousand in 1972; a 
76% increase in four years. During the same period, annual 
catch per vessel declined by 22.5% from 63.4 thousand 
pounds to 49.1 thousand pounds. This decline is even 
more drastic than is apparent since the composition of 
the fleet changed significantly toward larger vessels 
whose annual catch is considerably above average. It is 
therefore difficult to convert the higher gross revenues 
per vessel into an estimate of profit changes since costs 
have changed also. It has been estimated however that the 
indicated profit margins are now triple those obtained 
earlier. This would suggest 8¢/lb. based on MSY regula-
tion and 25¢/lb. based on MEE regulation. Assuming 
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a 50% tax rate, this would imply after tax profits of 
4¢/lb. and 12¢/lb. based on MSY and MEE regulation 
respectively. 
The market value of these catch rights would 
reflect their capitalized value which depends on the 
discount rate and the time horizon. Assuming a 20-year 
horizon, the present worth factors for discount rates 
10%, 12%, and 15% are 8.51, 7.46, and 6.26 respectively. 
Thus, the market value of catch rights would be in the 
range 25-34¢ per pound if MSY regulations were attained 
and a 75-102¢ per pound if MEE regulation were attained. 
If we assume a ten-year adjustment period, these rights 
may be heavily discounted. Using a 15% discount and a 
ten-year adjustment period, the initial value of individual 
catch rights may be expected to be 6-8¢ per pound based 
on MSY regulation and 18-25¢ per pound based on MEE 
regulation. These values would increase over time as 
catch per unit ,effort and net returns approach stable 
values and eventually would approach the earlier value 
ranges of 25-34¢ per pound and 25-102¢ per pound. 
If the management agency recovers part of its 
costs for research, administration and enforcement (via a 
landings tax, for example), the value of catch rights would 
be correspondingly reduced. Let us assume a 1¢ per pound 
levy on catch (meat weight basis). Let us abstract from 
the phase-in period which could require a decade or more. 
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The initial value of individual catch rights at MSY 
would then be about 5¢ per pound and would rise over 
time approaching 19¢ per pound eventually. These values 
would be windfall gains, which would accrue to owners 
of these rights. An owner could realize these values 
either as a lump sum payment or as an equivalent annuity 
or leasing fee when he sold or leased his rights. 
These estimates assume that the fishery would 
be managed at a sustainable yield of 70 million pounds. 
In fact the fishery has not been well managed, stock 
depletion has occurred, catches have fallen despite 
increased investments in vessels, and ex-vessel prices 
have soared. For the period 1968-1975, ex-vessel prices 
rose gradually from about 10 cents per pound in 1968 
to about 13 cents per pound in 1975. In 1976 however, 
price increases were quite remarkable, rising from 
24 cents per pound in January to 36 cents in April, and 
peaking at 58 cents in August. After August, some decline 
occurred; prices in December, 1976 were 52 cents. Thus, 
prices have more than quadrupled as participants have 
sought to maintain their respective shares of a shrinking 
resource base. Consequently~ the numbers given should 
be regarded only as rather crude estimates which are 
conditional on the implementation of limited entry 
measures and which can be revised as improved estimates 
of costs and prices become available. 
31 
The Catch Rights Plan places the incidence of 
benefits on fish1ermen; it allows for efficient vessel 
sizes and for technological improvements and for the 
efficient use of labor and capital. It can be designed 
to adjust to changing conditions of prices, costs and 
resource abundance. It allows individual units of the 
industry, whether a boat operator or a vertically inte-
granted corporation some degree of latitude in optimizing 
yield within the context of its own goals in contrast 
to an externally defined optimum. Management costs can 
be assessed against beneficiaries by taxes on landings 
or a license or property tax on catch rights. 
If the catch quota were based on the concept 
of MSY, each holder of CR would have the option of 
harvesting at some lower level to reduce costs or to 
maximize profits. This program would prevent harvest from 
exceeding MSY but would allow individuals to work toward 
MEE, if they wished to. Retirement is voluntary and 
sellers are compensated. 
If the partial relinquishment of governmental 
trusteeship over the surf clam resource is viewed as un-
desirable, some method of governmental recall of the 
certificates could be prescribed. Circumstances unfore-
seen at this time might lead to the conclusion at some 
point in the future that the catch rights scheme is un-
satisfactory. Catch rights might be issued for a 
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stipulated period of years which could be looked upon as 
a trial period during which procedures for continuation or 
termination would be formulated. One must recognize, 
however, that some of the potential benefits of the catch-
rights scheme arE~ dependent upon security of ownership 
of the rights. The MA always has the option of entering 
the catch rights market as a buyer of catch rights for 
the purpose of rE~tiring them. In this way retirement is 
voluntary and sellers are compensated. 
Although the concept of catch rights is not 
widely applied in fisheries, the private enterprise economy 
of the U. s .. is based on private ownership of raw materials. 
An analogue of catch rights in a common property resource 
is adjudicated water rights such as exist in arid western 
states. When· a groundwater aquifer (common property) 
is being depleted, a court procedure can be instituted 
whereby the sustainable yield of the aquifer is allocated 
among the users on a pro-rata basis. The quantity allocated 
to each user is determined by his rate of use during a 
stipulated base period, such as the preceding five years. 
Also similar in concept to catch rights is the allocation 
of radio communication frequencies. 
The CR scheme differs from vessel licensing 
schemes in regard to the ease with which a" fisherman can 
become established. Under a vessel licensing scheme, 
the licenses would be very valuable, indivisible assets. 
To maximize thi:s value, there would be a tendency over 
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time to replace small vessels with the largest, most 
technically efficient vessels; even though, from an aggregate 
viewpoint, two small vessels might be more cost effective 
than one large vessel. For a large vessel capturing . 9 
million pounds per year and the earlier value of 19¢/lb. 
the market value of the license exclusive of the boat 
would be in the neighborhood of $170 thousand. Because of 
the indivisibilities and capital market imperfections, 
it might be difficult for a young fisherman to get started. 
This result can be contrasted with CR which are divisible 
into relatively small portions of the optimum yield, as 
discussed earlier. Consider a young fisherman with a 
small vessel which can be projected to catch 200 thousand 
pounds. He need not purchase a $170 thousand license 
for his small vessel. Instead he can purchase catch 
rights for $38 thousand which entitle him to catch up to 
200 thousand pounds. While this sum is not trivial it is 
well within the range of what family businesses such as 
family farms might expect to pay for location or land 
rights. It should also be recognized that with such a 
scheme, profits and hence ability to pay would be 
substantially better than now. In the case of father-son 
fishing operations, there are mechanisms for intergenera-
tional transfers of asset~ such as CR, which minimize 
disruptions and estate taxes. Depending on the preferences 
of the individuals involved, sale of CR and external 
financing may not be necessary. 
34 
Monitoring and En:Eorcement 
The basic scheme will require that holders of CR 
report to the MA their catches at regular intervals. There 
must be an independent check on the catches through buyers 
or processors and the MA must keep a running talley of 
the catch under each block of catch rights. Various of the 
measures discussed under Refinements would require additional 
enforcement measures as noted. 
Conclusion 
From the preceding discussion it appears that 
the catch rights approach would be effective in protecting 
the resource, and in protecting the economic viability 
of the industry. The benefits of the measure are incident 
on holders of catch rights. It allows a maximum of flexi-
bility to fishermen in deciding how, when and where to 
harvest their catch. It does not preclude modifi-
cations to improve or refine the utilization of the resource. 
In our opinion the catch rights scheme is one of the better 
of the limited entry approaches. It has substantial advant-
ages over the approaches that license vessels and which are 
discussed next. A disadvantage relative to these is that 
catches must be carefully monitored to ensure that 
individuals do not catch more than their entitlement. 
To put this disadvantage in ·perspective however, it 
should be noted that some level of catch monitoring is 
required in all schemes and is required in order to evaluate 
the performance of any scheme. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. PL 94-265, Sec. 303 (b) (6). 
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LICENSING CATCH CAPACITY 
Anothe:r basic approach is to match fishing 
effort to the aggregate quota by licensing an appropriate 
number of catch capacity units to operate in the fishery. 
In this scheme, a license would authorize deployment of a 
vessel for a unit of time (perhaps a week). Several options 
exist. Either technological improvements could be restricted 
in an attempt to stabilize the number of units of gear 
operating, ,or changes could be allowed without restriction, 
in which case the number of vessels or amount of fishing 
time (or both) would need be reduced over the years. 
Additionally, all vessels could be treated equally, or 
they could be grouped into categories determined by 
characteristics of the vessel and dredge which affect 
harvesting efficiency. Property rights could be assigned 
to the licensees or could be retained by the MA. 
Implementation 
In essence, the appropriate catch level (MSY 
or other quota) must be associated with an appropriate 
number of effective catch capacity units, and thence, 
by arithmetic conversion to an appropriate number of 
licenses. Original distribution of catch capacity units 
to members of the fishing industry would involve the 
questions and alternatives as discussed under Catch Rights. 
Presumably some form of grandfathering formula would be 
involved. 
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The first step would be to define the catch 
capacity unit. We will use vessel-week in this discussion, 
though other units of time could be used. In the 
simplest and perhaps least equitable case all vessels 
would be treated equally. The catch target or quota 
would be divided by the average weekly catch of the fleet 
to determine the number of weeks of fishing to be allowed. 
Each licensee would then be authorized to deploy a 
stipulated number of vessel weeks. The number of vessel 
weeks which would approximate the catch target is less 
than would occupy the fleet for a full year. Fishing 
could either be restricted to a predetermined part of the 
year, or could b,e left to the discretion of the individual 
licensees. Technological improvements over the years 
would tend to increase the economic efficiency, and 
probably the profits, of the innovators, .but at the cost 
of reducing the total amount of fishing time allowed, the 
number of vessels, or both. 
A somewhat more complex, but perhaps more nearly 
equitable method of defining the catch capacity unit would 
be to group vessels of the then existing fleet into a 
few (3-6) performance categories so that the large stern 
dredgers would not be ranked with smaller, older side 
dredgers. Among the performance features to be considered 
in categorizing vessels would be vessel size, dredge size, 
pump capacity and other features that influence efficiency. 
This would be done on the basis of historic performance 
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of typical vessels. Vessel operators would not be allowed 
to significantly change their vessels or dredges. Pre-
cluding improvements would tend to stabilize the number 
of vessels operating and the duration of fishing season. 
The question of whether the government should 
retain property rights in the licenses or should assign 
them to the licensee must be addressed. If assigned to 
the licensee, then conditions of exchange must be specified 
as in the case with catch rights. As is the case with 
catch rights, effort units should be reasonably small 
(vessel-weeks, not vessel months) to .facilitate exchange 
and year-to-year adjustments in response to changes in 
population. 
In summary, the catch target would be converted 
from bushels of clams to vessel weeks and licenses issued 
entitling holders to deploy the appropriate amount of 
effort. Issuance of licenses involves the same issues 
and could be by the same means as discussed under 
Catch Rights. 
Analysis 
The goal of protecting the resource would be 
accomplished indirectly by establishing an effort quota 
rather than a straight-forward quota on catch. 
Because of the various options and sub-
options, discussion of the consequences of adopting any 
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one set is complicated. At least eight subsets of options 
are possible under this scheme as follows: 
roperty 
assigned 
equa< 
;vessel license 
Property 
Vessels 
Vessels 
categorize 
\person 
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"-..Person 
etained 
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The various options would have somewhat differing 
impact on the business climate of the industry. Treating 
vessels equally irrespective of size would encourage 
elimination of the smaller vessels with an attendant "arms 
race" to substitute large vessels capable of high catch 
rates. In turn this increasing catch capacity of the 
total fleet, would require a decrease in the number of 
vessel weeks in order to avoid exceeding the catch target. 
Two effects of the option are economically questionable. 
Treating all vessels equally would encourage premature 
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4 
s 
6 
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replacement of some vessels and would encourage surplus 
fishing capacity which would be forced to lie idle part 
of each year unless occupied in an alternative fishery 
such as that for ocean quahogs. 
If vessels were grouped into categories based 
on productivity, there would be less incentive to replace 
the less productive vessels. The competitive positions of 
the various categories would be fixed by the system. 
There would, however, be an incentive to increase the 
catching power of each vessel to the maximum extent allowed 
by the classification system. Therefore the MA would of 
necessity becomE? involved in approving or disapproving 
proposed modifications of vessels and gear, thus involving 
itself in economic decisions of fishermen. One questions 
whether the level of control implicit in this scheme could 
be achieved without very extensive input from industry 
concerning the E~fficiency of technological improvements, 
including mandatory disclosure of information that normally 
would be deemed proprietary. 
The options of licensing vessels or people also 
have economic ramifications which influence the business 
climate. Licensing vessels would tend to stabilize the 
number in the fishery, and also the size distribution, if 
categorized. The license would in effect state that tre 
vessel John Doe could operate in the fishery for a stipulated 
number of weeks. 
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Licensing people rather than vessels appears to 
offer advantages. If vessels were licensed the fleet 
size would be stabilized, but if people were licensed, 
freedom would exist to readjust the number of vessels as 
economic conditions dictated. Licensing people would 
encourage attrition from an overcapitalized fleet in that 
the number of licensees could be greater than the number 
of vessels. The vessel John Doe could fish the number of 
vessel weeks authorized by one license, then fish another 
period of time under authorization of another license. 
A vessel owner could fish his own license, then contract 
with one or more additional license holders. Thus the 
less efficient vessels would tend to leave the fishery 
as licensees contracted with operators of the more 
efficient. However no boat operator would be forced out 
by the government if he started off with a license. Each 
license holder would make the decision, within the context 
of his own business, of whether to operate his own boat 
or to contract with another boat owner. 
If the MA retains property rights, it must 
establish a procedure for redistribution of licenses 
that become inactive through .forfeiture, retirement or 
death of the licensee, or otherwise. Although licenses 
presumably would be valuable, the MA is precluded by 
PL 94-265 from distributing them by auction. Establishment 
of criteria whereby a limited number of licenses could 
be equitably assigned among a large group of applicants 
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seems an insurmountable task .. Lottery seems to be the 
best means of assignment. 
If property rights are assigned to the licensees 
then decisions concerning expansion or contraction of each 
individual fishing operation would be made internally within 
the context of the economics of the industry rather than 
externally in the arroa of the management agency. Down-
ward adjustment of fishing effort would be facilitated 
by private ownership of licenses in that not only the 
vessels, but also the right to fish would be salable 
commodities. If only the vessel were an economic asset, 
people would be: inclined to remain in the fishery as long 
as possible, especially as the vessel became more 
antiquated (less salable), whereas if the right to fish 
were marketable:, the owner of an old vessel might be 
disposed to scrap the vessel and sell or lease the 
license. 
If property rights were assigned, then industry 
would have considerable degree of freedom in adjusting 
the number of vessels actually fishing. Depending on the 
constraints placed on ownership of licenses, a single 
vessel owner might contract to fish the licenses of several 
different people. Licenses need not be tied to specific 
vessels or, in fact, to ownership of any vessel. 
Monitoring and Enforcement 
Enforcement would involve inspection to 
determine that each vessel was operating under a valid 
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license. The MA would also need to monitor the design 
characteristics and catch of each vessel for the purpose 
of detecting changes in effective catch capacity. 
Because total catch would be controlled by 
limiting catch capacity, the MA would need to issue 
licenses and the authority to prohibit improvements to 
technical efficiency, or to link their adoption to 
reductions in fleet size or fishing season. 
Conclusion 
A scheme based on licensing catch capacity could, 
in principle, be successful in protecting the resource and 
the economic viability of the fishery. However, in order 
to implement and enforce such a scheme the MA would have 
to prohibit technological improvements or link their adoption 
to reductions in fleet size or duration of the fishing 
season. While this is possible in principle we suspect 
that in practice it would prove onerous to industry and 
the MA. In practice such a scheme might tend to simply 
prohibit innovation even when innovations are cost-saving 
and socially desirable. 
The catch rights scheme authorizes a licensee. 
to take a specified quantity ·Of the resource. In contrast 
the catch capacity scheme authorizes licensees to deploy 
a specified quantity of fishing effort. Both could protect 
the resource, both could protect the industry, but the 
catch capacity :scheme would be more costly to administer 
and might depending on the option taken, preclude or dis-
courage innovation. 
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LICENSING VESSELS 
A licensing scheme based on vessels warrants some 
consideration. This scheme would issue licenses to a 
pre-determined number of standard fishing vessels. The 
harvest quota would be regulated indirectly through the 
number of vesseils. The industry would be stabilized 
by the limitation on the number of vessels. 
Implementation 
The plan would divide all existing vessels into 
a few ( 3 to 6) categories based on their capacity to 
catch clams. These categories would be defined and 
described. Only vessels fitting into one of the categories 
could be considered for licensing and new vessels could 
be licensed only upon retirement of an existing one. To 
accomplish the initial effort reduction, the appropriate 
number of licenses could be bought back and retired. A 
fisherman could, in general, buy out another in order to 
expand his total vessel capacity. Such ownership changes 
might however be subject to review to avoid excessive 
concentration. Long-term changes in the resource would 
be met by adjusting the number of licenses. Short term 
changes could be addressed by adjusting the length of the 
season. 
Property rights in the licenses could either 
be retained by the management authority or be passed to the 
licensee. If passed to the licensee, questions and 
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alternatives would be the same as in the case of Catch 
Rights. 
Mechanisms would be needed to retire vessels 
and to allow additional vessels into the fishery in re-
sponse to long-·term changes in the resource. Probably 
the MA would buy up licenses (and perhaps vessels) in 
order to retire them and would issue new licenses by 
lottery. 
Analysis 
The degree to which total catch approximated the 
desired quota would depend upon the accuracy with which the 
fishing efficiency of various vessel-gear combinations and 
arrangements could be approximated. Rather detailed reviews 
by the MA of vessel efficiency and characteristics would 
be required. A stable business climate could be provided, 
but at the cost of constantly attempting to stabilize 
effort through number of licensed vessels. 
An obvious difficulty in this approach is that of 
knowing whether a given change in gear or vessel design is 
merely routine maintenance or if it will increase catch 
capacity beyond that allocated to the particular category 
of vessel. If, for example, .a fisherman replaces an 
unreliable engine with a new one, will the replacement have 
the same thrust as the old? Since additional licenses 
would have to be purchased from other fishermen, the least 
expensive way will frequently be to invest in technologies 
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and gear which increase the catch capacity of existing 
vessels. For example, the industry might invest in a 
"factory ship" for offshore processing to release more 
time for dredging operations by dredge boats. 
This plan·is similar to Licensing Catch Capacity 
differing only in terms of the precision with which "effort" 
is regulated. However this difference is important for 
efficient vessel and gear design, incentives for technologi-
cal improvement and the costs of management. In order to 
closely approximate the annual catch quota, the management 
authority would have to hold fishing capacity at a fixed 
level. This would require becomming enmeshed in decisions 
or actions which are normally the exclusive province of 
private enterprise. The MA would need to authorize and 
monitor any proposed changes in vessels or gear which 
might affect fishing efficiency. This understandably would 
not sit well with fishermen and could be a costly management 
system to implement, monitor and enforce. 
Exchange of licenses would be less readily 
accomplished in this scheme than in the preceding ones in 
that licenses would be more costly. The relatively high 
.value of licenses would likely make the industry less 
fluid and encourage consolidation into a smaller number 
of larger operating units. Only well-capitalized units 
(corporations) would be able to participate readily 
in the market for licenses. 
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Monitoring and Enforcement 
Enforcement would consist of inspecting for valid 
licenses and inspecting modification of vessels or gear to 
monitor changes over time in catch capacity. The MA would 
need to monitor total catch and catch per unit of effort 
to ensure that the catch approximated the desired quota and 
to determine if adjustments in quota or class criteria 
were needed. 
Conclusion 
Limiting the number of vessels operating in the 
fishery could satisfy the goal of protecting the resource, 
in that the catch target could be approximated within an 
acceptable margin of error. Margin of error could be 
reduced by adjusting the length of the fishing season. 
Monitoring and enforcement requirements would perhaps be 
somewhat less than in the other schemes. The value of 
licenses might be so great as to result in a very limited 
market and hence lead to major consolidation within the 
industry over ti.me. 
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I REFINEMENTS 
While a program applying to the entire fishing 
area from Montauk Point to Cape Hatteras without geographic 
sub-division or other regulation might be adopted as a 
starting point, refinement is desirable. Some additional 
provisions, such as size limits, area and seasonal closures, 
while of themselves inadequate as management actions, could 
be incorporated in any of the preceding plans to improve 
its efficiency. Size limits should be established to 
obtain the maximum yield per recruit. Benefits would 
likely accrue from harvesting offshore beds during seasons 
of relatively calm seas and retaining inshore beds for 
harvesting during winter. These provisions are discussed 
next. Additional work will be necessary to determine the 
feasibility of incorporating these features. The important 
point to recognize is that such refinements are compli-
mentary rather than mutually exclusive and need not be 
instituted simultaneously with other provisions. 
Size Limits 
It is biologically unsound to harvest clams 
before they have spawned. Also it is economically un-
sound to harvest young, rapidly growing clams, which if 
left on the bottom for an additional period of growth 
would yield a greater quantity of meat. The most lucrative 
time to harvest is at the size of maximum yield per recruit. 
Surf clams attain sexual maturity at an age of one or two 
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years. Although the data are not· precise, maximum yield 
per recruit would appear to be attained at an age of 
from four to eight years, when clams are from 4.5 to 
5.5 inches long. In the offshore waters where growth is 
rapid, maximum yield probably would be attained near 5.5 
inches, but in nearshore waters where growth is slower a 
smaller size might provide the greatest yield. Natural 
mortality rate is not known at this time. 
Both data from research cruises and information 
from people familiar with the operation of vessels dredging 
clams commercially indicate that frequently clams in one 
bed are of predominately one size. Beds containing both 
large and small clams in appreciable numbers do exist 
however. Data now at hand do not indicate which type bed 
occurs most commonly. The size uniformity within beds is 
important for the effectiveness of a size regulation as 
discussed below. A dredge probably kills some clams 
washed free of the bottom in its path. Therefore a 
size limit seemingly could result in destruction of signi-
ficant quantities of small clams if beds containing clams 
of all sizes were dredged. If, however, sorting proved 
financially infeasible, vessel operators would seek out 
beds of large clams, and conservation might be well served. 
Beds containing small clams would be left undisturbed until 
they grew to the legally harvestable size thus maximizing 
yield per recruit. 
so 
A morie general question may be raised however. 
There are ground:; for suspecting that even under the best of 
circumstances, :size regulations, unless accompanied by 
limited entry mieasures will be of zero or trivial permanent 
benefit to fish1ermen. An intuitive statement of this result 
is as follows. Optimum size regulations will increase 
potential yield and potential economic benefits because they 
maximize yield for a fixed level of fishing mortality. Under 
open access conditions, however, this induces an effort 
supply response. The increase in fishing effort induces an 
increase in fishing mortality to the point where the potential 
gains are vitiated. A case study in which this result was 
1 
demonstrated quantitatively is Gates and Norton (1974). 
In prospecting for clams of harvestable size, 
a captain would be likely to capture some small clams. 
The management plan should perhaps attempt to minimize the. 
wastage of small clams taken inadvertently by allowing 
the landing of a small quantity of undersized clams. The 
desirability of avoiding waste must be balanced against 
the undesirability of encouraging directed fishing on beds 
of small clams. If an allowable tolerance of small clams 
per trip came to be considered as a quota or catch target, 
conservation would be poorly served. Probably the safest 
course is to start with a rather stringent tolerance limit 
and to relax the restriction if experience shows this to 
be desirable. 
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One problem with "knife-edged" regulations on 
size is that they do not recognize the probabilistic 
nature of the harvest. Under the best of intentions, the 
quota on undersized clams may be exceeded on an occasional, 
random chance basis. When this happens, to discard the 
excess makes sense only if the survival rate for discards 
is quite high. An alternative would be to place a tax 
on the excess. The level of the tax would be set so that 
it is in fishermens interest to search for large clams 
because of a substantially higher profit margin. At the 
same time, given a random catch of undersized clams, the 
tax should be low enough that retention is preferred to 
discarding the excess. Such a strategy encourages fishing 
strategies to avoid small clams but avoids waste of 
inadvertent catches. 
Imposition of a size limit alone would do 
nothing to discourage overcapitalization. Some method of 
limiting entry or assigning property rights would be needed 
to provide stability to the industry. 
Area Closures 
Prohibition of harvest in certain areas, at 
least during part of the year, could be used as an 
additional refinement. Closure would be to allow growth 
of undersized clams or to reserve beds in protected waters 
for harvest during winter when harsh weather disrupts work 
offshore. In the latter case the closure would be seasonal. 
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Area closures might complement size limits in the 
attempt to maximize the yield per recruit. If vessels 
harvest beds having populations of several sizes and the 
small clams are culled from the catch, wastage will be 
significant because survival is poor when clams are re-
turned to the water after being dredged up. Therefore, 
to the extent that area closures could be enforced, it 
would seem desirable to prohibit harvest from beds having 
appreciable numbers of clams smaller than the size that 
gives maximum yield. 
It must be recognized that enforcement would be 
difficult and costly especially at night and at some 
distance from shore. 
Area closures would be ineffective as the sole 
management tool because overcapitalization would not be 
prevented. Nevertheless, area closures offer promise as a 
complement to other management measures. There is another 
important, though subtle, cost of area measures which are 
imperfectly enforced. If area restrictions are circumvented 
byrnisstating the grid in which harvest actually occurred 
then scientific analysis of catch data by area may be 
rendered meaningless. 
At the same time, the necessity of area closures 
(other than possibly spawning sanctuaries) may be questioned 
on the grounds of redundancy. The geographic allocation 
of fishing effort may be viewed as a predator-prey process 
in which re-allocation toward areas with highest stock 
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abundance is an automatic, dynamic process. Thus, closure 
of depleted beds may be regarded by fishermen as a nice, 
innocuous management me.asure because they have no intention 
of fishing in such areas except for sampling purposes. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Gates, John M. and Virgil J. Norton. 1974. The 
Benefits of Fisheries Regulation: A Case Study of the 
New England Yellowtail Flounder Fishery. University of 
Rhode Island Marine Technical Report No. 21. 
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SOME CRITERIA FOR APPRAISING MANAGEMENT SCHEMES 
The many facets of limited entry schemes suggest 
that more than one criterion is appropriate in appraising 
them. Specifically, an appraisal should consider (1) 
the incidence of benefits and costs both economic and 
social, (2) implications for technological improvements, 
(3) flexibility to respond to changes in costs, prices and 
resource abundance, (4) the costs of management, and (5) 
efficient use of labor and capital. We will review these 
criteria briefly in this section and relate each to the 
three basic types of limited entry schemes. An over-
riding issue of feasibility within existing laws and 
institutions, i.s discussed in Part· II. 
The best scheme is one which maintains the resource 
in perpetuity and le aves to the private sector maximum 
flexibility in decisions concerning social and economic 
issues. The management authority must be careful to 
distinguish between providing the opportunity for the private 
sector to. make social and economic decisions and ignoring 
social and economic issues. Too often in the past governmental 
managers have not left flexibility, but instead by ignoring 
issues, have actually forced.certain social or economic 
consequences. Outstanding among these has been the over-
capitalization forced by open access to common property 
fisheries resources. 
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Incidence of Benefits and Costs 
Benefits from entry limitation in either of the 
licensing approaches would accrue directly to fishermen. 
Some of this could, however, be appropriated by the 
management authority through licensing or leasing fees or 
through a tax on catch. It would seem judicious to 
impose a temporary effort moratorium before instituting 
these management schemes. If potential profits are deemed 
great enough, s:peculators may attempt to enter the fishery 
just before a licensing scheme is implemented. 
Certainly the question of "fairness" of the 
initial distribution of access in a limited entry scheme 
is of great importance to fishermen. Unfortunately, 
perceptions of fairness will vary among people and over 
time. The complexities which may arise in achieving 
fairness are very great. 
Regarding economic and social issues, a manage-
ment scheme should allow and encourage decision-making by 
the people and companies participating in the fishery 
rather than by the management agency. In this regard the 
best plan is the one which provides to the fishermen the 
greatest flexibility and greatest range of options possible 
within the fundamental constraints of the resource. 
Especially to be guarded against is the resource-oriented 
provision which accidentally or incidentally narrows or 
forecloses social or economic options. 
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In general it is true that the power to make 
socio-economic decisions is greatly enhanced by property 
rights. Thus those schemes which assign property rights 
to licensees would give to the fishermen greater decision-
making power than those in which the property rights are 
retained by the MA. Additionally the catch rights scheme 
would appear to require fewer restraints than the other 
property-rights options. 
Implications for Technological Improvements 
It seems probable that fishermen will be 
interested in a scheme which allows the more efficient 
inventive, or industrious individuals opportunity to 
advance their position. If so, then the regulatory scheme 
should allow returns to initiative and to operational 
improvements, as in any other industry, rather than 
restricting methods and technologies which could increase 
efficiency and lower costs. 
Under the licensing of catch capacities, it 
would be desirable to ensure incentive for innovation. 
Suppose all effort were indexed, as described earlier, 
and an appropriate number of standardized effort units 
were licensed to each participating firm. Then, if one 
individual wishes to make an operational improvement, the 
management authority could require him either to retire 
some of his own effort or to buy out someone else.' s 
licenses to·compensate for the effective effort increase 
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inherent in his innovation. In either case, he is 
potentially reducing the costs of harvesting any given 
quantity of clams and so it will be worth his while to 
make the innovation only if cost savings are sufficient 
to warrant buying some vessel-weeks. 
Note that under a licensing of vessels scheme, 
the only way in which the management authority can combat 
the effort increases of technological change is by buying 
back licenses and retiring entire vessels. 
Under the catch rights approach, there is always 
incentive to innovate, i.e., to catch one's quota at a 
lower cost. Consequently, operational improvements will 
always be sought - without altering the total amount of 
clams caught. The additional profits forthcoming from the 
improvement will accrue to those who adopt it, but such 
improvements will not alter total catch and hence will not 
diminish the catch per unit effort of other fishermen. 
It is possible that the initial distribution of rights will, 
for some fishermen, be too smallto achieve the economies 
of size attendant in large vessel operation. A free 
market in catch rights could serve to mitigate this problem 
as well; the returns from large-scale operations may be 
sufficient incentive for the more enterprising to bid 
licenses away from others. Indeed, were this not so, 
there would be no basis for concern about undue con-
centration of rights as mentioned earlier. Thus, the 
conservation effects of catch rights are the same as 
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those of an idealized system for licensing standardized units 
of effort. However, the catch rights approach does not 
require continual assessment of factors influencing effort 
as is necessary in the effort licensi~g scheme. 
Flexibility under Changing Conditions 
Changes will be introduced into the regulated 
fishery from various sources which suggest the need for 
flexibility in the various components of an overall 
management plan, including limited entry components. 
An increase in demand with fixed or shrinking supplies 
will increase prices. No adjustments are necessary in either 
the licensing of catch capacity or catch rights. Under 
these approache:s, effort and catch do not respond to price 
changes in the short-run. The short-run effect of price 
increases is simply an increase in the profits of fishermen. 
If the licensing of vessels (only) approach were used, 
however, then each time market conditions changed, there 
would be an incentive for firms to increase their catch 
by whatever means possible. These might include larger 
dredge, overtime crews, offshore processing etc. As 
noted earlier, the only adjustment mechanism available under 
this plan would be the continued buy-back and retirement of 
vessels and/or a complementary quota scheme to stabilize 
catch. 
Alternatively, a change in the status of the 
stocks or the management authority's perception of that 
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status will involve adjustments similar to those required 
in the initial phase of an effort limitation scheme. In 
the catch capacity licensing approach flexibility could 
be achieved by adjusting the length of the fishing season 
or by reducing the number of licensed effort units in poor 
years and increasing them in good years. Reductions could 
be achieved by refusing to renew more than the prescribed 
number, by purchase of excess effort units or by temporary 
lease (by the MA) of excess effort units. Similarly in 
the catch rights approach, excess rights can be handled by 
scaling down all rights proportionately, by purchase 
of excess rights, or by lease of excess rights. In 
either approach, reduction (or increases) in the total 
catch can be allocated among individuals and this allocation 
need not be compulsory. Use of voluntary market means 
are possible provided a revenue base exists which the 
management authority can use to buy or lease the desired 
excess. Presumably those fishermen most willing to sell 
or lease would include the less efficient at fishing, 
including those whose opportunity costs (non-fishing 
employment opportunities) are highest. 
Cost of Management 
Another criterion for appraisal of limited entry 
schemes is their administrative complexity and costs. The 
costs of management include funds designated for research 
and monitoring of stocks. This work would probably 
be done for resource oriented management measures with 
or without limited entry. In addition, there are the 
expenses of the limited entry scheme per se, i.e., 
administrative, compensation, enforcement, etc. The 
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cost of managememt is important in a time of scarce public 
funds. It is in the interest of fishermen, consumers 
and taxpayers to ensure that a given management measure 
be adopted only if the benefits exceed the costs of 
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. 
Resource assessment and monitoring the catch 
would cost nearly the same irrespective of the type of 
plan. The various schemes which assign property rights would 
be expensive to implement, but then private enterprise 
would take over the exchange of licenses with the management 
agency having only to record transfers in order to maintain 
an accurate record of ownership. Thus the long-term costs 
would not be great. Probably the least costly schemes 
would be Catch Rights and the simplest Catch Capacity 
option. Cost would increase with the need to monitor or 
prohibit changes in vessels and gear. 
Efficient Use of Labor and Capital 
The efficiency of limited entry schemes has 
already received some discussion under implications for 
technological improvements. In addition to these criteria, 
a management scheme should permit efficient use of labor 
and capital in both the harvesting and processing sectors. 
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An aggregate annual quota plan without limited entry 
provisions would, for example, result in overcapitali-
zation and a race to catch as many clams as possible before 
the aggregate quota is exhausted. Once the quota is 
exhausted, vessels and processing capacity would be idle 
for the balance of the year. An effect of such a scheme 
in isolation could be excessive supplies at the beginning 
of the fishing season and a dearth of supplies later in 
the season. This would represent an inefficient use of 
labor and capital. 
Another dimension of efficient use of labor and 
capital concerns the effect of limited entry measures on 
the choice of harvest systems. The dimension is best 
illustrated by considering a vessel licensing system. With 
a limited number of licenses, fishermen will look for methods 
which increase catch without requiring additional licenses. 
The ingenuity of private enterprise in such situation is 
marvelous. Unfortunately, innovations will not necessarily 
result in the least costly harvest system. Excessive re-
sources (labor and capital) will be devoted to increasing 
the innovators catch per vessel per day. Unfortunately, 
the gain to the innovator is at the expense of other fisher-
men. Over time as imitators adopt the innovations, the 
gains which were initially apparent to innovators will 
vanish. On the other hand, innovations which permit a 
fisherman to harvest the same catch at lower cost are desir-
able for everyone since they will not diminish the total catch. 
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MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS UNSUITED TO THE SURF CLAM FISHERY 
For the sake of completeness, a few concepts 
are presented h«=re which, although applied with greater 
or lesser degree of success in some other fisheries, seem 
inappropriate to the surf clam fishery. 
Leasing Bottom for Harvest of Clams 
Under this concept the MA would lease the exclusive 
right to harvest shellfish from numerous defined tracts as 
is done with tracts for petroleum exploration and develop-
ment. For those states involved in the surf clam fishery, 
state control over submerged lands stops at a point three 
miles from shore. Any management plan calling for bottom 
leasing would require participation by the Federal Govern-
ment since a significant quantity of the resource exists 
in submerged land beyond the three mile limit. 
Allowing each lessee to manage the harvest 
from the leased bottoms as he deemed to be in his best 
interest would have the advantage of requiring little 
governmental regulation once the tracts were leased. How-
ever, the surveillance system needed to hold piracy to a 
reasonable minimum would be so costly as to make this 
plan of highly doubtful value. There is the additional 
problem of determining what activities the lessee could 
conduct and what rights others would have to use the 
leased area. 
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In short, although appealing in concept leasing 
seems impractical in the surf clam fishery. 
Catch Limits 
Although catch limits (i.e. catch per vessel per 
day or per week) are imposed in many fisheries, this 
procedure appears poorly suited to the surf clam fishery. 
Catch limits alone would neither control the total annual 
harvest nor contribute to a stable business climate in 
the long term. 
The approach would be to establish the maximum 
; 
allowable catch for each vessel for each day or other 
period of time (week or month). Presumably the manage-
ment agency would at the outset establish the daily catch 
limit so that the total annual catch approximated the 
MSY (or other catch target). The broad range in fishing 
power of vessels now operating presents a problem in 
arriving at suitable limits. The smallest vessels are 
capable of taking on the order of 100 bu per day whereas 
the most effective stern dredgers are capable of taking 
up to 3000 bu/day. It would be unreasonable to apply one 
catch limit to all units of the fleet. The limit might 
be based on carrying capacity of the vessels or on width 
of dredge (so many bushels per inch of dredge width per 
day). 
The weaknesses of this approach are that it 
fails to control total harvest, that it mitigates against 
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efficient harvesting techniques, and that it encourages 
the "arms race" climate. If any number of additional boats 
could be brought into the fishery, the daily limit would 
provide no control over total harvest. Any processor 
having a market for more clams could buy, build, or 
contract with additional vessels. Additional vessels 
would enter the fishery until it became unprofitable and 
the stock became overfished. Indeed, the need to even 
consider such limits implies the existence of excessive 
effort. Moreover, there are difficulties, as mentioned 
above, in establishing limits which recognize differences 
between vessel catch capacities in an equitable way. 
Quotas 
Establishing MSY as a total catch limitation is 
a regulatory mechanism that has been applied in a few 
fisheries, for example the Pacific halibut, and yellow-
fin tuna fisherh!s. While a quota satisfactorily protects 
the resource, this type of regulation does not provide the 
sort of business climate in which one can make long-term 
investment decisions. In short, it foster the business approach 
of "get all you can while you can", which in turn leads to 
overcapitalization and unsatisfactory profits. Thus a quota 
fails the object:i.v,e of protecting the industry. 
Dividing the quota among various geographic 
areas improves the biological aspect, but does not resolve 
the arms race problem of excessive effort. In addition, 
effort tends to re-deploy from areas of low success to 
areas to high success. Consequently, area quotas at 
best will tend merely to sanction what would have taken 
place any way. 
Gear Regulations 
The eoncept behind gear regulation seemingly is 
that if only inefficient gear is allowed, overfishing 
will be prevented by the high cost of harvesting. Thus 
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a management agency might limit the size of dredge or size 
or type of vessel that could be used to harvest clams. 
This approach would not meet the goal of protecting the 
industry or minimizing costs and is not likely to protect 
the resource. It should be noted that the economics of 
regulated inefficience are very similar to a user fee or 
tax. Profits are reduced by increasing costs instead of 
reducing revenues. The end effect can be to prevent 
over-exploitation but only if the degree of inefficiency 
is increased enough to remove the profit margin which 
attracts additional effort. The resultant "conservation 
by cost" is still wasteful however in that the same 
amount of product could have been delivered at less cost 
via efficient harvest technology and limited entry. 
PART II 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT REGIMES 
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INTRODUCTION 
The surf clam fishery encompasses an area off 
the coasts of several eastern states, primarily New York, 
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia. At the 
northernmost range of the fishery, surf clam beds are 
found close inshore. As one moves south, however, the 
beds are found progressively further offshore, ultimately 
far beyond the present United States territorial sea. 
Both the operation of the industry and the distribution 
pattern of the resource make the development of an 
effective management plan difficult. 
In the pas~ there has been little effective 
cooperation among the states or between the states and 
the Federal Govi~rnment in developing a management plan for 
the surf clam f:ishery. Jurisdictional authority has 
been fragmented among the several states and the Federal 
Government. Prior to the passage of the Fishery Conserva-
1 tion and Management Act of 1976, the Federal Government 
lacked a clear mandate regarding the management and 
regulation of domestic fishing. 
On April 13, 1976, .the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act was signed into law and this marked the 
beginning of a significant new period in the history of 
the United States fisheries. Now,new authority is vested 
in the Federal Government for management and regulation 
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of domestic and foreign fishing interest. This 
new legislation, although providing an improved manage-
ment and regulatory framework, has not completely resolved 
previously existing problems and has created a unique set 
of new problems. 
The goals of the legal portion of this study 
will be to analyze the present legal framework for manage-
ment, identify potential legal impediments associated with 
the establishiment of various management proposals, and 
identify possible alternative mechanisms for the develop-
ment of an effe!ctive management regime. 
THE PRESENT JURISDICTIONAL STATUS OF THE 
SURF CLAM FISHERY 
The present management framework is a blend 
of the old and the new. However, the key to understand-
ing present state and federal roles in fishery management 
is the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. 
The surf clam fishery is less complex than 
other fisheries since it has never been subject to 
recreational or foreign fishing. Although jurisdiction is 
the province of the federal and state governments, more 
than two simple zones of jurisdiction are involved. 
The surf clam fishery involves these legally 
defined zones of jurisdiction: the internal waters of the 
states; the territorial seas of the states; the high seas; 
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the fishery conservation zone; and the continental shelf. 
These zones serve different jurisdictional purposes and 
while some are separate and distinct, others overlap. By 
way of definition, the internal waters of a state are 
those waters landward of the innermost boundary of the 
territorial se,:1. The territorial sea runs from an inter-
nationally accepted baseline along our coast out to a 
distance of three miles and this three mile belt or' 
jurisdiction parallel to the coast is divided into separate 
areas of state jurisdiction. 
Beyond the territorial sea lies the high seas 
from which a special area of jurisdiction, the fishery 
conservation zone, has be carved. The fishery conservation 
zone, extending 197 miles beyond the outermost limit of the 
territorial sea, exist only for purposes of fishery 
management and conservation and leaves intact, where applicable, 
other freedoms associated with the high seas. 2 
The continental shelf, as defined under U. S. 
and international law, means the seabed and subsoil adjacent 
to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, 
to a depth of 200 meters or beyond to where the depth of 
the superadjacent water admits of the exploration of the 
natural resources of such areas.3 As one might logically 
expect the degree of state control over any zone parallels 
the physical proximity of the zone to the state. States have 
more authority over fisheries in internal waters than in 
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territorial seas, and even less authority beyond the 
territorial sea. 
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 
1976 (FCMA) creiated a fishery conservation zone (FCZ) for 
waters 197 nautical miles beyond the seaward boundary of each 
of the coastal states of the United States. 4 FCMA became 
effective on March 1, 1977 and vests in the United States 
exclusive management authority over all fish within the 
fishery conservation zone, and all continental shelf 
fishery resources beyond the FCZ, as well as providing for 
United States jurisdiction over anadromous species except 
when they enter waters under the jurisdiction of other 
nations. At the international level, no claims of 
sovereignty in the waters in this zone are made and no 
interference with recognized legitimate uses of the high 
seas, except as are necessary to implement fishery manage-
ment and conservation, are authorized by the Act. 5 The 
states retain most of their traditional rights in relation 
to fishery regulation under the new Act. 
StatE~ jurisdiction over fisheries is 
recognized in common law principles, court decision, 
and both state and federal legislation. 6 State juris-
diction has beEm recognized to extend not only to internal 
and territorial waters of a state but also to include 
State vessels and citizens on the high seas operating 
beyond state territorial waters. 7 Through landing 
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regulation states have also acted to control non-resident 
fishing activities. 8 It must be remembered that such 
state authority has been and will continue to be subject 
to the exercise of certain paramount federal powers. 
Under FCMA state authority over internal waters 
is reserved completely to the states while state authority 
over territorial waters is reserved to the states subject 
to certain exceptions. State jurisdiction over its vessels 
and citizens beyond territorial waters remain possible 
only if there is no conflict with regulatiomwithin the FCZ. 
State control over non-residents is now at issue before the 
Supreme Court and is also questionable under FCMA. The 
portion of FCMA, pertinent to state jurisdiction is Section 
306 and it s ta t,2s: 
. (a) In General.--Except as provided in sub-
section (b), nothing in this Act shall be construed 
as extending or diminishing the jurisdiction or 
authority of any State within its boundaries. No 
State may directly or indirectly regulate any 
fishing which is engaged in by any fishing vessel 
outside its boundaries, unless such vessel is 
registered under the laws of such State. 
(b) Exception.-- (1) If the Secretary finds ... 
that--
(A) the fishing in a fishery, which 
is covered by a fishery management plan 
implemented under this Act, is engaged in 
predominantly within the fishery conserva-
tion zone and beyond such zone; and 
(B) any State has taken any action, 
or omitted to take any action, the results 
of which will substantially and adversely 
affect the carrying out of such fishery 
management plan; 
the S,ecretary shall promptly notify such State and 
the appropriate Council of such finding and of his 
intention to regulate the applicable fishery within 
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the boundaries of such State (other than its 
internal waters), pursuant to such fishery 
management plan and the regulations promulgated 
to implement such plan. 
(2) If the Secretary ... finds that the 
reasons for which he assumed such regulation no 
longer prev~il, he shall promptly terminate such 
regulation. 
The .Act reaffirms the right of a state to regulate 
fishing even beiyond its territorial waters where its own 
citizens or vessels are involved. However, the FCMA also 
seems to limit a state's control beyond the three mile waters 
to these instances and cjrcumstances alone. By forbidding 
a state to "directly or indirectly" regulate fishing beyond 
its boundaries, excepting the above two instances, the FCMA 
makes extended state regulation aimed at nonresidents and 
effected through landing laws dubious in validity. 
Furthermore, if federal regulation in the conserva .. 
tion zone is exercised, even permissible extended state 
regulation which conflicted with it would have to yield 
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Even without 
conflict, federal regulation in a particular area might pre-
empt exercise of state power in the same area. 
The Act is to be administered by eight regional 
councils: New England, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, Cari-
bbean, Gulf, Pacific, North Pacific, and Western Pacific. 10 
Each council will be composed of voting and non-voting 
members. Voting members will include: the chief state 
official with marine fishery management responsibility and 
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expertise in each constituent state, designated as such by 
the Governor; the regional director of the National Marine 
Fisheries Service for the geographic area concerned, or 
his designee, except that if two such regional directors 
exist for one council area, the Secretary of Commerce shall 
designate which of the two shall be the voting member; and 
at least one qualified individual appointed by the Secretary 
from each state:, selected from lists submitted by the 
Governor of eac:h State. 11 ]~on-voting members will include: 
the regional or area director of the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Servic:e for the geographical area, or his designee; 
the commander for the Coast Guard district involved, 
or his designeei, except that if two Coast Guard districts 
are within the area the person designated by the commandant 
of the Coast Guard shall serve; the executive director of 
the Marine Fisheries Commission for the area concerned, or 
his designee; one representative of the Department of State, 
designated by the Secretary of State, or his designee. 12 
Each Council is to reflect the expertise and 
interest of the various constituent states (or territories) 
13 
in the ocean area over which such Council is granted authority. 
Management plans for the fisheries subject to FCMA regulation 
can be initiated by the Regional Councils or by the Secretary 
14 
of Commerce, but in either case the plans must meet 
certain prescribed national standards and aims listed in 
the Act. 15 The enumerated standards concern prevention of 
overfishing, achieving the optimum yield, relying on the 
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best scientific and academic information available, manage-
ment of fish throughout their migratory range, treatment of 
interrelated stocks as a single unit where possible and 
conveneient, non-descrimination between residents of different 
states or territories, promotion of efficiency, recognition 
and allowance for the contingencies involved in fishery 
resources and catches, and the minimization of costs with 
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reference to the other goals. 
Where a regional council prepares a fishery plan, 
it must be submitted to the Secretary of Commerce who is 
required to review it within sixty days and notify the 
council of approval, disapproval, or partial disapproval. 
If the Secretary objects to all or part of a management 
scheme, he must state his grounds for objection, suggest 
improvements, and request that the council make the necessary 
modifications. If the council fails to prepare a plan or 
to alter a faulty one, the Secretary may prepare a fishery 
management plan. The Secretary should then submit his 
plan to the council for suggestions, but he is not bound to 
alter his plan should the council receive it with criticism. 
Again, the Secretary's plan must conform with the same 
. 1 d d d f h · 1 ·1 17 nationa stan ar s enumerate or t e regiona counci s. 
The surf clam is one of the enumerated fisheries 
subject to the conservation and management provis.ions of 
18 the FCMA. Power granted under the FCMA will be used to 
regulate the surf clam fishery beyond state territorial 
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waters within the conservation zone. Whether federal 
power will be used even within state waters as provided 
19 by Section 306 (b) remains to be seen. Certainly the 
FCMA has laid the groundwork for a vigorous federal 
program of fishery management. 
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SPECIFIC LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
United States Constitution 
Introduction 
It is clear to most observers that any effective 
scheme for the management and conservation of fisheries 
• 
resources must include limiting the amount of fishing 
effort. It is imperative to consider the legal impli-
cations of such a management policy before attempting 
to formulate or implement any specific plan. 
In establishing any limited entry program, free 
access to the re:source will be restricted. This creates 
the possibility that persons who were previously taking 
as much of the resource as they desired migh~ challenge 
the program. Their challenge would most likely rest on 
due process and/or equal.protection grounds under the 
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, 
and on any similar provisions of state constitutions. It 
is important, therefore, to examine due process and equal 
protection standards in order to be able to satisfy 
constitutional requirements in formulating a program. 
In brief, a person who feels aggrieved by a 
limited entry scheme would claim (1) that he was deprived 
of property (the fish, or the right to catch the fish 
and make a living) without due process of law; and (2) 
that the program, because of the standards it used in 
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deciding what quantities could be taken and which partici-
pants would be allowed to take them, discriminated against 
him, violating his right to equal protection under the law. 
Thus any .restriction on access to the resource might 
trigger the due process claim while the charge of viola-
tion of equal protection will be directed at the classifi-
cations and standards for allocating the restricted amount 
of resource. \~ith this as background, the way these two 
provisions are interpreted and applied by the United States 
Supreme Court will be summarized. 
Due Process 
The clause reads: " ... nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law ... " To satisfy this provision, 
(1) legislation must be aimed at a legitimate object of 
state regulation, and (2) the method chosen to achieve 
the legitimate end must bear a reasonable relationship 
to that end. Put in limited entry terms, the key 
questions would be (1) is economic regulation or conserva-
tion of the fishery a legitimate object of state regula-
tion, and (2) does a limited entry program bear a reason-
able relationship to conservation of the fishery? 
With respect to the first question, conservation 
of resources has been established as a legitimate object 
f .L • 1 or state regu.ation. Promoting sound economic manage-
ment of a fish,:'!ry has also been held to be a legitimate 
purpose for state regulation. 2 
80 
The second question cannot be answered by simply 
showing that re!ducing access to the resource will conserve 
it, although careful biological and economic proof will help 
sustain any limited entry legislation. The problem is 
the extent to which government regulation may interfere 
with the right to engage in a particular economic activity. 
To decide this, the Court will balance the hardship to 
some individuals against the public benefit. Where the 
public benefit is clearly and positively served, the Court 
will tolerate severe restrictions on individual activities. 
For example, the federal courts upheld a Maryland statute 
which, in effect, eliminated the commercial menhaden 
fishery in state waters by prohibiting the use of purse 
nets in Maryland waters.3 Maryland had enacted the 
prohibition to promote sport fishing, and the Court respected 
the State's judgements that (a) sport fishing should be 
encouraged, and (b) that the most efficient way to achieve 
this end was prohibition of purse nets. Interference 
with an economic activity will not of itself bar state 
regulation as long as the regulation is clearly for the 
public benefit .. 
Equal Protection 
The clause reads: " ... nor shall any state 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." As with due process, this clause 
breaks down into two aspects: (1) is there a legitimate 
public purpose involved, and (2) is the classification 
within the statute reasonably related to the purpose of 
the statute. As discussed above, conservation of 
fisheries is a legitimate public purpose. 
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The federal courts have two standards for equal 
protection, the strict scrutiny test and the rational 
relationship test. When a statute involves a fundamental 
right (e.g., spieech, vote, religion) or the basis of the 
classification is inherently suspect (e.g., race, religion), 
the statute will be strictly scrutinized and will be upheld 
only if there i:s a compelling state reason for making the 
classification. This is a very hard test to satisfy. 
Limited entry should not trigger the strict scrutiny test, 
however, since :it will not involve a fundamental right 
nor should it involve a suspect classification. 
The standard which will be applied is the rational 
relationship test, where a classification will be held valid 
if it has some relevance to the purpose of the act. Put 
in limited entry terms, since the aim of the program is 
conservation and economic regulation of a fishery, any 
standards and classifications must relate to that end. 
For example, restricting access only to red-headed fisher-
men would be um~easonable and not related to the aim of 
the statute. On the other hand, a lottery system where 
all those with the same qualifications had an equal 
chance to gain E~ntry would probably be upheld. 
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The key to equal protection is that similarly 
situated individuals must be treated the same. The 
Supreme Court grants legislatures great discretion in 
4 classifying groups for equal protection purposes. In 
addition, legislation carries a presumption of constitutiona-
lity, so the federal courts will try to avoid overturning 
legislation if reasonable justification can support it. 
As a general proposition, the federal courts will tolerate 
fishery regulation that is not arbitrary, unreasonable 
or clearly discriminatory. 
In formulating a particular limited entry statute 
it would be useful to consider the present Alaska limited 
entry act. 5 Thi.s act carefully set standards for deciding 
which fishermen would get permits, setting classifications 
on the basis of economic dependence on the fishery, past 
participation in the fishery, and ability and intent to 
participate in the fishery. Well planned classifications 
which consider the needs of the industry as well as the 
fishery will satisfy equal protection. 
Summary 
The constitutional standards of due process and 
equal protection are not mathematical formulas which can 
be applied to a statute to give a positive yes or no 
answer regarding its validity. They are flexible measures 
of the limits of state regulation over individual activity. 
On the basis of past decisions it appears that the federal 
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courts would uphold a reasonable, non-discriminatory 
limited entry scheme. Economic and conservation regula-
tions in the public interest are valid areas of state 
concern. To help assure that an act is upheld, any 
limited entry scheme should be supported by firm biological 
and economic data proving that such regulation is necessary 
and in the public interest. Careful drafting of the 
scheme to assur«~ that similarly situated individuals are 
treated alike will also help sustain the program from 
constitutional attack. 
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1. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). 
2. Nebbia v. N,ew York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
3. Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771 (1957), aff'd 355 U.S. 
37 (1957)-. -
·4. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1969). 
5. A. S. Section 16.43.010 et.~· 
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STATE LAW AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Introduction 
Management alternatives under FCMA range from 
federal regulation within the FCZ with individual state 
or interstate regulation of territorial seas to federal 
regulation of ·the FCZ and territorial seas by preemption. 
Under FCMA federal preemption of state authority may be 
triggered by state action or inaction causing management 
conflict. Although the great majority of the surf clam 
resource is harvested within the FCZ and subject to 
federal regulation under FCMA, state laws affecting 
resource management, may prove important in developing 
an effective and comprehensive management scheme. 
In this section, the laws of New York, New 
Jersey, Delawa1~e, Maryland and Virginia, states with 
significant participation in the surf clam fishery, are 
analyzed, as are the laws of the two bordering states of 
Connecticut and North Carolina. Constitutional, statutory, 
or regulatory language is often subject to differing inter-
pretations. As a practical matter, the limiting factor in 
many cases may be interpretation and implementation at the 
management level. For these· reasons it is important for 
state management authorities and their legal advisors to 
review their own statutes, regulations, and administrative 
customs in ordE~r to determine what scope of management 
authority exist within the statutory framework and also 
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to identify possible areas of conflict with federal regulation 
under FCMA. 
The categories considered are as follows: 
Constitution. The state constitution provisions 
on due process and equal protection are considered. In most 
cases the state courts, which are the final authority in 
construing the state constitution, use standards similar to 
those used by the federal courts interpreting the federal 
constitution. In addition, some states have other constitutional 
provisions relevant to limited entry, and these provisions 
are considered. The purpose of this subsection is to explain 
the constitutional limits of limited entry legislation in 
the various states. 
Prote:ction of Marine Resources. In some states, 
the state court has specifically addressed the problem of 
protecting marine resources, and the attitude of the state 
towards such conservation is analyzed in this subsection. 
As a general rule, a state owns the marine resources within 
its waters, but that ownership is deemed to be for the public 
benefit. The state ownership is for the purpose of regula-
tion, but that regulation is subject to any recognized 
constitutional restraints. Thus, to say that a state owns 
its marine resources does not avoid the limitations on 
regulation derived from constitutional rights. 
Present Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure. 
The existing fishery or shellfish management statutes in 
each state are presented in this subsection. This section 
identifies the entity having authority over shellfish 
management and the extent of that authority. 
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Criteria for Management. In this subsection, 
statements of management policy and statutory standards 
for management .are presented. 
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts. Certain 
states grant their management agency the authority to 
enter into management agreements with other states. 
This subsection considers that grant of power. 
Existing Surf Clam Regulations. Certain states 
have current regulations or statutes in effect which 
regulate the surf clam fishery. These are itemized. It 
is important to know what regulations exist, and whether 
they derive from a statute (in which case an act of the 
legislature would be necessary to alter them) or from a 
regulation of the management agency (in which case the 
procedures for changing regulations would have to be 
followed). 
Summa!.Y. In this subsection the impediments to 
limited entry in each state are itemized. The constitutional 
dangers and the scope of existing management structures and 
criteria are analyzed as is the necessity for amending 
existing surf clam regulations. 
Connecticut 
' Constitution. Connecticut follows the federal 
standards in applying the equal protection and due process 
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clauses of the state constitution. Persons may be classi-
fied as long as the classifications are fair and are 
bl 1 d h f h 1 . 1 . 2 reasona y re ate . to t e purpose o t e egis ation. 
The Connecticut courts recognize the right of the 
state to regulate property and pursuits of trade, with the 
limitation that all persons in the same situation be treated 
similarly. 3 Regulation of business must not be unreasonably 
in excess of what is necessary to accomplish the legislative 
end.4 In addition, "right to work" language in Connecticut 
common law resulted in a court holding that the principle of 
equality of rights must be observed in regulating a business 
in which all citizens have an equal right to participate. 5 
It may be argued that a fishery is a business in which every-
one has a right to work. In order to exclude participants by 
means of a limited entry scheme, the need for limiting access 
may undergo strict judicial scrutiny. Connecticut has a 
tradition of acknowledging the right to work in businesses 
not "clothed with the public interest." Usually regulated 
businesses are those with great potential for damage to the 
public by way of fraud or health hazard. In order to qualify 
as an industry requiring regulation (and therefore requiring 
limited entry), it would be necessary to prove the damage 
to the general welfare in having an unregulated fishery. In 
states where business regulation is readily accepted, there 
would be a lesser burden of proof than in Connecticut, which 
traditionally has supported the freedom to work without 
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' 
restriction. This does automatically bar limited entry in 
Connecticut, but rather requires careful planning and 
drafting of a program to qualify in that state. 
Protection of Marine Resources. Connecticut does 
not have a body of case law recognizing the power of the 
state to protect its fishery resources. Connecticut has 
relied on tight statutory language in resource protection, 
and the courts have generally recognized only the statutory 
powers to protect these resources. Therefore, it will be 
difficult to imply the power to initiate a limited entry 
plan within the present legal framework of the state. 
Present Fishery/Shell Fishery Management Structure. 
The Commissioner of Environmental Protection administers 
all fish and wildlife laws in Connecticut. 6 The authori-
zation is not to manage or protect the resources, but rather 
to carry out certain enumerated administrative duties. 
Licenses are required of all persons over 16 who 
want to fish. 7 Vessels are also licensed. 8 Shell fish 
9 grounds are taxed, and speculation in shellfish grounds 
. . 10 is prohibited. Any license holder may be required to 
report to the Commissioner data concerning vessel size, 
11 gear, catch or any other information requested. 
Criteria for Management. Since the Department of 
Environmental Protection has little discretion in managing 
shell fisheries, there is no statutory statement of criteria 
to be used. The broad language authorizing protection and 
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conservation familiar to other state statutes is absent 
from Connecticut statutory law. Where discretion in 
management is allowed by statute, it is only a specific 
grant for a specific fishery. For example, Connecticut 
allows regulation of anadromous trout, salmon and charr, but 
specifies by statute what goals and means are to be 
12 
observed in management. Thus criteria for management 
are not readily ascertainable. 
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts. The 
Commissioner of Environmental Protection is authorized to 
cooperate with agencies of the Federal Government and of 
other state governments. 13 Connecticut is a member of the 
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact and has ratified 
amendment I of this compact. 
Existing Surf Clam Regulations. Connecticut 
prohibits taking of clams by non-residents, 14 and as 
stated above, requires residents to obtain a license. 
Summa:EY.. Connecticut's constitutional law 
would accept limited entry, although the common law 
tradition of right to work will require firm proof that 
regulation is needed. The statutory management scheme 
is very tight, leaving little room for any implied powers. 
Connecticut would require legislation to implement limited 
entry. Since E!Xisting legislation allows a daily catch 
1 . . b f 15 1 · . d h imit to e set or oysters, 1m1te entry s ould not be 
foreign or replusive to the Legislature. It would, however, 
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be outside the statutory authority of present management 
agencies to initiate such a scheme. 
Delaware 
Constitution. The Delaware Court uses the 
formula and int,erpretation employed by the United States 
Supreme Court when examining the validity of economic 
regulation under the state due process and equal protection 
clause.16 
For due process, the Court looks first to see 
if the objective of the statute or regulation is a legiti-
mate one. For example, is conservation of the fishery 
resource or economic management of the fishery a legiti-
mate purpose? Second, is there a rational relationship 
between the means used to achieve the objective and 
the objective itself? For example, is limiting the number 
of fishermen a rational method to achieve the objective of 
conservation or economic efficiency? The Delaware Court 
would answer both of these questions in the affirmative. 17 
For equal protection, the Court will examine the 
classification to determine whether it bears some relation 
to the purpose for which the classification was made. 18 
A statute carries a presumption of constitutionality, and 
the Legislature has a wide discretion in matters of classifi-
cation. The legislative judgement will not be disturbed 
unless the act (classification) is clearly arbitrary. 19 
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There are no other constitutional provisions 
which might relate to limited entry. 
Protection of Marine Resources. No significant 
body of· case law was discovered on this subject. 
Present Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure. 
Shellfish in Delaware are managed by the Delaware 
Commission of Shell Fisheries. This is a five member 
Commission, appointed by the Governor, with at least two 
members who are engaged in the shellfish industry. 20 The 
Commission may issue permits to persons engaged in the 
shellfish industry and may set fees not to exceed $.05 
per bushel. 21 
The basic authority of the Commission is as 
follows: 
"The Commission shall have full control and 
direction of the shellfish industry and the 
protection of shellfish throughout this state." 
Regulations of the Commission carry the force of law. 22 
Criteria for Management. The Commission is to 
regulate for the following purposes: 
"(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
To p~eserve and improve the shellfish 
industry in this State. 
To operate, cultivate, and replenish on 
the oyster or clam grounds or beds in 
waters within the jurisdiction of this 
State. · 
To regulate, inspect and approve any boat 
or vessel or equipment used in the shell-
fish industry in this State. 
To provide regulations for th~ replacement 
of any boat or vessel lost'or destroyed 
which was licensed in the shellfish industry 
of this State. 
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(5) When deemed necessary to provide for the 
issuance of permits to persons engaged in 
the shellfish industry in this State and 
for the revocation for cause of such 
permits. 
(6) To provide for the preservation and improve-
ment of the oysz3r and clam beds and grounds 
of this State." 
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts. The Dela-
ware Commission of Shell Fisheries has no authority to enter 
interstate agreements. An act of the Delaware Legislature is 
required to bind the state to an interstate compact. Dela-
ware is a member of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 
Compact, but has not consented to amendment I of this 
compact. 24 
In a compact with New Jersey on fishing in the 
Delaware River and Bay, each state expressly reserved 
jurisdiction over shell fishing. The pertinent portion 
reads as follows: 
111Nothing contained in this chapter shall affect 
the territorial limits, rights or jurisdiction of 
the States of Delaware or New Jersey of, in, or 
over the Delaware River, or in the ownership of 
the s:ubaqueous soil thereof, except as is expressly 
set forth in the compact between the two States; 
nor shall anything contained in this chapter affect 
in any way the planting, catching or taking of 
oysters, clams or other shellfish or interfere 
with the oyster industry, as zarried on under the 
laws of either of the States. ) 
Although this is not a general reservation of 
power, it is possible that Delaware would not be willing 
to agree by compact to give up any of its power over shell 
fisheries. 
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Existing Surf Clam Regulations. The present license 
requirements derive from the statute, as follows: 
A permit is required from the Commission, and a 
tax of $.05 per bushel may be levied. 26 
Other regulations derive from the Commission, as 
follows: 
From .June through September surf clams can be 
taken no closer than two miles from any part of the shore-
line. From October through May, surf clams can be taken 
only within two miles of any portions of the shoreline 
of the State. 27 
Summa1~. The Delaware Constitution should not bar 
a limited entry scheme. The Commission of Shell Fisheries 
has a broad mandate to regulate the industry, including 
licensing vessels and issuing permits to persons engaged in 
the industry. This authority contains no restriction as 
to what factors may be considered in setting management 
policy. 
Maryland 
Constitution. The Maryland Supreme Court follows 
the standards for decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in construing the due process and equal protection 
1 f h . . 28 cause o testate const1tut1on. 
For example, the 1971 Maryland wetlands statute 
prohibiting dredging of any tidal waters or marshlands 
29 
withstood attack on due process grounds. The 
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preservation of natural resources was held to be a valid 
exercise of the police power. This case indicates that the 
Maryland court would be very inclined to accept the legis-
lative determination that limited entry was necessary for 
30 
conservation of a fishery resource. 
One other Maryland constitutional provision that 
must be dealt with is the prohibition of monopolies. The 
article states that: 
monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit 
of a free government and the princip1rs of 
commerce, and ought not be suffered. 
The Maryland court has said that a momopoly must 
be more than a mere privilege to carry on a trade or busi-
ness; it must be an exclusive privilege which prevents all 
others from participating. A limited entry plan is not 
confined to one 1entity as the monopoly clause envisions, but 
involves a number of units participating in the fishery. 
In addition, if the grant of privileges is necessary for 
the protection of some public interest (justified under 
the police power) it will not fall within the ban on 
monopolies. 32 Thus a limited entry scheme should be 
able to avoid this provision. 
The anti-monopoly provision must be kept in mind 
when planning the future operations of the limited entry 
scheme. For example, if licenses or stock certificates are 
used, the subsequent transferability of the instruments and 
rights must be controlled to prevent creation of a monopoly 
situation. 
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Protection of Marine Resources. Maryland 
recognizes protection of natural resources as a valid exer-
cise of the state police power (see above, Maryland wet-
lands statute). Even when fish are taken and reduced to 
possession by an individual, ownership of a fish species 
may be regulated and restrained by appropriate legislation 
for the benefit of the public. 33 In addition, Maryland 
allows its Department of Natural Resources to maintain 
its own list of endangered species, and the catching, 
processing or selling of any such listed species is 
totally prohibited. 34 In Corsa v. Tawes35 the District 
Court for Maryland held that in the practical management 
of its resources such as fish and game, the state may 
conclude that the time for action is long before the 
destruction has gone so far that the extinction of the 
species is imminent, and the protective hand of the state 
may be extended before the danger is unmistakably imminent. 
Thus, anticipatory planning and management are accepted 
concepts in Maryland law. 
Present Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure. 
The Department of Natural Resources is responsible for all 
natural resource policies and plans in the state.36 The 
Fisheries Administration of the Department is charged with 
the conservation management of fish within the state.37 
The Fisheries Administration can promulgate regulations 
relating to all living natural resources of the tidal 
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waters. 38 These regulations may include, but are not limited 
to, provisions enlarging, extending, restricting or pro;_ 
hibiting the taking or catching of these resources. 39 
Licenses are required for taking clams and oysters, with a 
residency requirement of one year and set statutory fees 
based on type of gear used. 40 
Criteria for Management. The authority for manage-
ment is found in the enumeration of responsibilities and 
duties of the Secretary of Natural Resources, as follows: 
The Secretary is responsible for the development 
of coordinated policies for the preservation, 
conservation, wise use, and perpetuation of the 
natural resources of the state.41 
Under this broad grant of authority, the Secretary may 
regulate by considering any legitimate, relevant factors. 
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts. The 
Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources has the 
h . d 1 . 1 . 42 h h aut ority to recommen egis ation. Te Department as 
the power to negotiate interstate agreements, as follows: 
The Department may negotiate any agreement with 
any other state concerning catching fish, the 
size of fish, and opening and closing fishing 
seasons. ::S 
Maryland is a member of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 
Compact and not a party to amendment I of that compact.44 
Existing Surf Clam Regulations. Regulations 
relating to surf clams are limited to license, fee, and 
residence requirements.45 
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Summa!:_y. Under due process and equal protection, 
Maryland courts should uphold a limited entry scheme, but 
care must be taken to avoid the anti-monopoly term of the 
Constitution. The broad authority given to the Department 
of Natural Resources should include the ability to impose 
a limited entry scheme. 
New Jersey 
Constitution. Tu satisfy due process, 46 the 
New Jersey Court must be convinced that the interests of 
the community as a whole are being served by the regulation, 
and that the means selected bear a substantial relationship 
to the object of the statute. In upholding an economic 
regulation, the court stated: 
"(U)nder the police power the legislature may 
make provisions for the economic welfare of the 
people ... When conditions in a business become 
such that the welfare of the public will not be 
adequately protected by unrestricted competition, 
or if it be shown that ruinous and chaotic 
conditions are otherwise about to be brought about 
by the business, or that the economic existence 
of large numbers of people is being threatened, 
then the law may step in and prescribe regulations 
to correct the alleged or threatened abuse. 1147 
Limited entry legislation could probably sustain a due 
process challenge in New Jersey. 
New Jersey follows the United States Supreme Court 
1 t . . . 48 h h 1 . f · · on equa protec 1.on 1.nterpretat1.on, were t e c assi 1.cat1.on 
is not based upon suspect criteria, such as race or wealth, 
and the violation of a fundamental right is not involved. 
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If the limited entry scheme would not trigger strict 
scrutiny under equal protection, New Jersey would follow 
the federal "rational relationship" test. 
Under this equal protection test, wide discretion 
is given to the Legislature in classifying, so that any 
limited entry seheme that is not blatantly discriminatory 
will meet New Jiersey standards. 49 
Protection of Marine Resources. The power to 
regulate fisheries is recogni.zed, 50 and regulations for 
the preservation of shell fisheries have been held valid 
and constitutional. 51 
Present Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure. 
The Department of Environmental Protection, through the 
Division of Fish, Game, and Shell Fisheries, manages fishery 
resources. 52 Shellfish are managed by a nine member Shell 
Fisheries Council, appointed by the Governo11.53 
Criteria for Management. The authority granted 
is as follows: 
The! Shell Fisheries Council shall, subject 
to the! approval of the Commissioner, formulate 
compre!hensive policies for the preservation and 
improv5~ent of the shellfish industry of the state. 
There are no other enumerated.limitations on the power or 
standards for management. 
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts. The 
' 
Division of Natural Reso~rces of the Department of Environ-
mental Protection has the following power: 
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"(d) Cooperate with other State agencies and 
departments and with interstate and Federal de-
partments and agencies, and with interested 
individuals and groups in the promotion and 
development of plans, policies, and programs 
for the study, beneficial use, conservation 
and protectign of natural resources within 
the State. 11 .':>.':> 
In addition, New Jersey maintains an Inter-
governmental Relations Commission, whose function is 
defined as: 
"to carry forward the participation of this State 
as a member of the Council of State Governments, 
both regionally and nationally, to confer with 
officials of other states and of Federal Govern-
ments, to formulate proposals for cooperation 
between this State and the other States, and 
with the Federal Government, to maintain liaison 
with the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations established by Federal law, and to 
organize and maintain governmental machinery for 
such purposes. 11 56 
It appears that interstate agreements are the province of 
both organizations, with the Division of Natural Resources 
having special authority over natural resources alone. 
New Jersey is a member of the Atlantic States 
Marit-e Fisheries Compact and a party to amendment I of 
this compact. 57 
Existing Surf Clam Regulations. New Jersey law 
sets forth a system encompassing a limited number of 
licenses, overall weekly quotas, area and season closures, 
gear restrictions, data requirements and fees based on 
resource harvest.58 
Summa!Y. The New Jersey constitutional requirements 
should be easily met by a limited entry scheme. The mandate 
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to the New Jersey management entity is broad enough to 
include promulgation of regulations for limited entry. 
The present shellfish regulations are statutory, so any 
limited entry program would have to either (1) meet the 
same standards as the existing statutes or (2) include 
legislative action to amend or repeal the shellfish laws. 
New York 
Constitution. To satisfy due process59 in New 
York, legislation must promote the health, safety or wel-
fare of the public in general, rather than give a special 
benefit to a particular class, and the means used must be 
reasonably related to the accomplishment of the "public" 
objective. 60 A particular class of people may be incidentally 
benefited by legislation, as long as the legislation also 
benefits the public as a whole. If it does promote the 
public welfare, it will meet due process requirements, even 
if it inflicts a hardship on certain people. 61 
Under New York equal protection62 standards it is 
necessary to prove that the classification has a relation 
to a public purpose. The Legislature has broad discretionary 
powers of classification, and a classification will be struck 
down only if it is clearly arbitrary. 63 A reasonable classi-
fication of fishermen or vessels under a limited entry 
scheme would not be arbitrary and would bear a rational 
relation to the objective of the statute and therefore 
would withstand equal protection attack. 
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Protection of Marine Resources. Conservation and 
regulation of fish and animals have been held to be the 
responsibility of the state, as a matter of public interest.64 
The New.York Court, in Grossman v. Hotel Astor, 65 accorded 
great deference: to the legislative judgement in regulating 
natural resources, and acknowledged great discretion in the 
legislature in the formulation of conservation plans. 66 
New York treats natural marine resources as the 
property of the state, held in its sovereign capacity for the 
benefit of all people, and the court recognizes great power 
in the state to regulate fisheries. 67 
Under the Environmental Conservation, Fish and 
Wildlife Act, the state owns all fish, wildlife and shell-
.fish, so that even upon possession, title remains in "the 
state for the purpose of regulating and controlling their 
d d . . . 1168 use an 1.spos1t1on. · 
Present Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure. 
Fishery management duties belong to the Department of 
Environmental Conservation, whose powers and duties include: 
promotion and coordination of water, land and air resources, 
and providing for the protection and management of marine 
and coastal resources.69 
In addition, the Department has the power: 
"To issue licenses and permits provided for by 
law, to fix their terms, and the fees therefor, 
when no statutory provision is made, and ?8 revoke 
licenses and permits as provided by law." 
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"To regulate the taking of fish in any manner 
other than angling, except as to migrat~IY fish 
of the sea within the marine district." 
"To control, manage, propagate and distribute, 
and to regulate the transportation, importation 
and exporation of shellfish and crustacea."72 
"To regulate the examination and inspection of 
shellfish grounds, boats used in taking and 
buildings used for storage of shellfish, the 
handling and shipment of shellfish, the floating 
of shellfish, the removal of shellfish from 
unsanitary beds and their deposit on unpolluted 
grounds. 11 73 
"To enforce all laws relating to lands under 
water which have been or shall be designated, 
surveyed and mapped out pursuant to law as oyster 
beds or shellfish grounds and to grant leases of 
such lands, belonging to th74state, for shellfish culture, according to law." 
Criteria for Management. The purpose of the New 
York Fish and Wildlife Law is to effect the "efficient 
management of the fish and wildlife resources of the 
state. 11 75 The statutory guidelines for management are 
as follows: 
"To such extent as it shall deem feasible 
without prejudice to other functions in the manage-
ment of fish and wildlife resources of the state 
and the execution of other duties imposed by law, 
the department is directed, in the exercise of 
the powers conferred upon it, to develop and carry 
out programs and procedures which will in its 
judgmEmt, (a) promote natural propagation and 
maintEmance of desirable species in ecological 
balance, and (b) lead to the observance of sound 
management practices for such propagation and 
maintenance on lands and waters of the state, 
whether owned by the private ownership, having 
regard to (1) ecological factors, habitat and 
the importance of ecological balance in maintaining 
natural resources; (2) the compatibility of 
production and desirable land uses; (3) the 
importance of fish and wildlife premises and of the 
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persons and property of occupants thereof against 
abus: of p~iv~leges of ac~ess 7g such premises for hunting, fishing or trapping." 
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts. The 
Department of Environmental Conservation has the following 
power: 
(To effect efficient management it) "shall include, 
to the extent authorized by law, the undertaking and 
execution of reciprocal and cooperative arrangements 
with the government of the United States, with other 
states, and with other departments and agencies of 
this state, political subdivisions and public 
corporations of this state and owners and lessees 
of privately owned lands and waters and shall also 
include continuation of research and educational 
programs. 11 77 
Thus, the power to enter interstate agreements is granted. 
New York, although a member of the Atlantic States Marine·. 
Fisheries Compact, is not a party to amendment I of that 
compact. 
Existing Surf Clam Regulations. New York requires 
that persons engaged in shellfishing carry a digger's permit; 
there is a six month residency requirement for a digger's 
. 77a permit. 
Shippers and processors must have a permit, and 
there is a one year residency requirement to market shell-
fish. No clams less than 3 inches in longest diameter may 
be exported from the state. The penalty for violation of 
the regulation is loss of permit.77b 
Summa!.Y_. The New York constitutional standards 
should not bar limited entry. The state ranks preservation 
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of natural resources very highly. The statutory grant of 
power would appear to give the Department of Environmental 
Conservation the authority to limit entry and consider 
economic factors in regulating a fishery. 
North Carolina 
Constitution. The North Carolina equal protection 
and due process clauses 78 have been interpreted according 
to the standard federal tests.79 Legislation satisfies 
due process requirements if it is not unreasonable, arbitrary 
or capricious and the means selected have a substantial 
relation to the objects sought to be attained.so Statutory 
classifications must be reasonable and must be related to 
the public health.81 
North Carolina has a strong "right to work" 
d · · d · . . 82 Wh th h tra 1.t1.on un er 1.ts constitution. en estate soug t 
to license dry cleaners, the statute was struck down with 
strong language: 
The right of a citizen to pursue any of the 
ordinary vocations, on his own property and with 
his own means, can neither be denied nor unduly 
abridged by the Legislature for the preservation 
of such right is the principle purpose of the 
Constitution itself. In such cases, the limit 
of legislative power is regulation, unless the 
business is of such character as places it w!th-
in the category of social and economic ills. 3 
The court felt that there was no public interest to be 
protected in the regulation of dry cleaning that would 
justify invading the right of a citizen to choose his 
occupation. 
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Limited entry would have to be clearly justified 
to satisfy a North Carolina court. Because of the common 
law pattern of protecting the right to work, the public 
benefit to be derived by limiting entry must be clear and 
convincing to persuade the court that the legislature may 
invade this private right. 
Recently the North Carolina court reiterated its 
position on the: right to work. A North Carolina statute 
had permitted a. licensing commission to deny permits to 
build hospitals if the commission felt there was no need 
for an additional hospital in the area. The court held 
this to be unconstitutional under equal protection and due 
process. 84 Regulation of totally private enterprise· on 
the basis of economic need for that enterprise in the 
community was held to be beyond the police power of the 
state. 
Any exercise by the State of its police power is, 
of course, a deprivation of liberty. Whether it 
is a violation of the (due process) clause or a 
va~id exercise of the police power is a question 
of degree and of reasonableness in relation to 
the public good likely to result from it. To 
deny a person, association, or corporation the 
right to engage in a business, otherwise lawful, 
is a far greater restriction upon his or its 
liberty than to deny the right to charge in that 
business whatever price~5the owner sees fit to charge for the service. . 
Limited entry may be justified on economic as well as other 
criteria. North Carolina, however, has shown reluctance 
to allow infringement on the right to work solely on· the 
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basis of economic criteria. Limited entry can be distinguished, 
however, since the fishery resources are subject to public 
regulation, whereas in In Re Certificate of Need for Aston 
Park Hospital the state was attempting to regulate a totally 
private industry. The court was in essence saying, if 
private industry wants to take the risk, the state can't 
interfere. With fishery resources, however, the state has 
an interest as custodian of the resource. 
Additional constitutional considerations revolve 
around the anti-·monopoly clauses. 86 Exclusive franchises 
are unconstitutional,87 but legitimate classifications that 
can withstand equal protection tests will not fall under the 
monopoly or exclusive privilege clauses. A grandfather 
clause, entitling a person to a present right only if he had 
participated in the industry at some time in the past, is also 
unconstitutiona1. 88 The North Carolina constitution would 
probably bar a limited entry program in which rights could 
be inherited. 
Pre_servation of Marine Resources. North Carolina 
has a strong common law tradition of recognizing the power 
of the state to protect its fishery resources.89 Conserva-
tion is viewed in terms of state ownership of the fishing 
resources, with all rights of access and harvest left to 
the discretion of the state. 90 
By statute as well as common law, the power 
of the state to protect its resources is acknowledged. 
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The marine and estuarine and wildlife resources 
of the State belong to the people of the State 
as a whole .. The Department and the Commission 
are c:harged with stewardship of these resources. 91 
Prese~nt Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure. 
The Department of Natural and Economic Resources is charged 
with the duty of promoting the conservation and development 
of the natural resources of the state. 92 The Marine Fisheries 
Commission of the Department is empowered "to make regulations 
and take all steps necessary to develop and improve the 
cultivation, harvesting and marketing of oysters and clams 
in North Carolina both from public grounds and private beds. 1193 
All vessels must be licensed, 94 with maximum license fees 
set by statute, 95 and clammers must also have licenses. 96 
Clams are taxed at 6 cents per bushel. 97 License holders 
can be required to keep certain records on demand of the 
Department. 98 
Crite!ria tor Management. The Department of Natural 
and Economic Resources is authorized to promote "conservation 
and development of natural resources" and "development of 
commerce and industry. 1199 In addition, there is a state 
policy to promote coastal fisheries and the seafood industry.100 
There is also the stewardship provision mentioned above. 
In addition to the.broad general powers written 
into the statute, the Marine Fisheries Commission is 
authorized to authorize, license, regulate, pro-
hibit:, prescribe, or restrict all forms of marine 
and estuarine resources in coastal fishing waters 
with respect to: 
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(1) Time, place, character or dimensions of 
any methods or equipment that may be employed 
in taking fish; 
(2) Seasons for taking fish; 
(3) Size limits on and maximum quantities of 
fish that may be taken, possessed, bailed to 
anothE~r, transported, sold or given away. 
(b) The Marine Fisheries Commission is 
authorized to authorize, regulate, prohibit, 
prescribe, or restrict and the Department is 
authorized to license: 
(1) The opening and closing of coastal fishing 
waters, except as to inland game fish, whether 
entirE~ly or only as to the taking of particular 
classE~s or fish, use of particular equipment, or 
as to other activities within the jurisdiction 
of thE~ Department; and 
(2) The possession, cultivation, transportation, 
importation, exportation, sale, purchase, acquisition, 
and disposition of all marine and estuarine resources 
and all related equipment, implements, vessels, and 
conveyances as necessary to implement the1t5£rk of the Department in carrying out is duties. 
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts. The Depart-
ment of Natural and Economic Resources is authorized to 
cooperate with agencies of the Federal Government and of 
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other states. North Carolina is a party to the Atlantic 
State Marine Fisheries Compact and Amendment I of that 
compact. 
Existing Surf Clam Regulations. There is 
licensing of vessels and clammers, and a tax per bushel, 
as mentioned above. 
Summat:y. The common law supporting the right 
to work will have to be carefully considered in drafting 
limited entry legislation for North Carolina. Before 
fishermen can be! excluded, the need for limited entry will 
have to be clearly demonstrated and the allocation scheme 
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will have to be carefully developed. However, some precedent 
exists for economic management of fisheries in North Carolina. 
Shrimp seasons, for example, are opened and closed on the 
basis of the commercial size of the shrimp, a factor un-
related to biological conservation. 103 The state might be 
willing to accept economic criteria for fishery management. 
In contrast with the state constitutional law, 
the management statutes are quite broad and imply a great 
deal of power vested in the management agencies. The 
agency can liceinse vessels and clammers, and tax clams to 
the statutory limit. 
Virginia 
Constitution. The Virginia Court applies the same 
test and interpretation to the State due process clause104 
as the United States Supreme Court applies to the federal 
due process provision: does the statute promote public 
welfare and does it employ reasonable means to accomplish 
that end~os 
The E!qual protection provision is as follows: 
The General Assembly shall not enact any 
local, special, or private law in the following 
cases: 
(12) Regulating labor, trade, mining, or 
manufacturing, or the rate of interest on money. 
(18) Granting to any private corporation, 
a~sociati'?n? or indiv~dual.any15gecial or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity. 
The construction of this provision turns on the phrase 
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"special laws," and the fact that a law benefits only 
some of the people does not of itself make it a special 
law; the classification of persons in the statute must be 
reasonably related to the purpose of the act, meaning 
that the clause is interpreted in the same way as the 
equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.107 
The Legislature is given wide discretion in classifying, 
and legislative judgment will be overturned only when 
it is clearly arbitrary. 
The other relevant portion of the Virginia 
Constitution is Article XI, which makes conservation of 
natural resources a state constitutional policy,108 and 
directs the state to cooperate with other states, the 
Federal Government, units of the Virginia government, 
and persons interested in the conservation of natural 
resources. 109 
Protection of Marine Resources. Virginia treats 
fisheries as the common property of its citizens - a 
property over which the State is entitled to legislate. 110 
The Constitutional provision for protection of natural 
resources discussed above also reflects the State 
attitude toward protection of resources. 
Present Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure. 
The Marine Resources Commission manages fisheries in 
Virginia. It i.s a seven member Commission, with members 
representing a variety of users of marine resources in the 
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state. The Commission can enact regulations. Violation 
of regulations is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of 
not more than $1,000 or imprisonment of not more than 12 
months, or both.112 
In 1973 this additional power was granted to 
the Commission: 
The Commission is authorized and empowered to 
promulgate such regulations as it deems necessary 
and appropriate to promote the consrr~ation and 
wise use of the surf-clam resource. 
Criteria for Management. The Commission's power 
to make regulations is modified by the standard: 
"to promote the general welfare of the seafood 
industry and to conserve and promote the seafood 
and marine resources of the State, including 
regulations as to the taking of seafood, which 
regulations do no11~onflict with the provisions of statutory law. 
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts. The 
Marine Resources Commission has not specifically been 
granted the power to negotiate interstate agreements on 
marine resources. Virginia is, however, a party to the 
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact and Amendment I 
of that compact. 
Current Surf Clam Regulations. There are at 
the present no surf clam regulations in Virginia. However, 
any purchaser of shellfish must obtain a $25.00 license for 
each place of business, and a $15.00 license for each boat 
or motor vehicle used.115 
Summa:!.Y.. The due process and equal protection 
standards of Virginia can be met, as long as the "Special 
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laws" standard is observed. The state has a constitutional 
policy of resource conservation. The management authority 
is broad, and surf clam management is specifically authorized, 
so a limited entry scheme for surf clams should be acceptable. 
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ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT SCHEMES 
Introduction 
In this section several alternative systems of 
limiting entry are presented. For each alternative (a) 
the legal problems associated with the proposal will be 
itemized; (b) the ability of each of the states to enact 
the proposal will be summarized and (c) the status of 
the proposal under FCMA will be examined. 
I. QUOTAS 
(A) This alternative involves setting a maximum 
limit on the total harvest, and usually refers to an annual 
quota. The legal problems are twofold; first, do existing 
management statutes authorize agencies to set quotas, and 
second, how shall this allotted catch be divided among the 
participants in a fishery? Since setting a maximum 
permissible catch is a crucial part of any limited entry 
program, this is a key threshhold issue. Quotas as an 
alternative in themselves usually represent a simple system 
of deciding how much of a stock can be harvested, ignoring 
allocation, and declaring the fishery closed when the 
maximum has been taken. This is economically inefficient 
and subject to a due process attack. 
(B) Each of the states has the following powers 
with respect to setting an annual quota: 
Connecticut - no implied power 
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Delaware - implied, under Del. Code Ann. Tit. 7, 
sec. 1904 
Maryland - implied, under Md. N. R. 4-202,1-104 
New Jersey - implied, under N.J.S.A. 13:lB-45 
New York - implied, under N.Y.E.C.L. sec. 11-0305 
North Carolina - express, under N.C.G.S. 113-182. 
Virginia - implied, under Code of Va. 28.1-23 
(C) FCMA Section 303 (b) (3) allows a Regional 
Management Council the discretion of instituting quotas. 1 
II. AREA CLOSURES 
(A) A program may seek to limit entry hr closing 
certain areas to fishing. To do this, a state must have 
the authority to close areas and the power to declare such 
closures on the basis of economic as well as biological 
criteria. 
(B) The present management structures offer the 
following powers with respect to area closures: 
Connecticut - no implied power 
Delaware - implied under preservation of clam 
beds, Del. Code Ann. Titl. 7, sec. 1904 
Maryland - implied, under "preservation," Md. 
N. R. Sec. 1-104 
New Jersey - implied, N.J.S.A. 13:lB-45 
New York - implied from power to regulate the 
taking N.Y.E.C.L. sec. 11-0305(3) and power 
to preserve the grounds, N.Y.E.C.L. sec. 
11-0305(7) 
North Carolina - implied from power to restrict 
place of taking fish N.C.G.S. 113-182. 
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Virginia - implied under regulation of taking of 
seafood, Code of Virginia 28.1-23. 
III. SHORT TERM CATCH LIMITS 
(A) This program involves having the management 
agency set a daily, weekly or monthly limit on how much can 
be harvested. The authority to set limits on catch is express 
for some species in some states (e.g., oysters in Connecticut), 
but it might also be implied from the power to manage the 
resource. 
(B) Only New Jersey has specific authorization 
to set short term catch limits for surf clams. 2 In other 
states it i.s implied from the same provisions as is the 
power to impose a quota. (I, (B)). Where the power to 
manage has been used to impose catch limits on other species 
(e.g., Connecticut oyster catch limits) there should be no 
statutory bar to imposition of a catch limit on surf clams. 
(C) Under FCMA short term catch limits appear 
to be possible under Section 303 (b) (3) .3 
IV. LICENSES OR PERMITS 
(A) This program limits entry by licensing 
only a limited number of participating units. The 
licenses might run to vessels, fishermen or gear, depending 
on which unit was best suited to serve as an avenue for 
control of exploitation of the stocks. Limited entry 
licensing differs from present licensing patterns since 
there would only be a certain number of licenses available, 
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and the management entity would have to decide who would 
receive them. The legal problems, therefore, do not stop 
at the power to issue licenses, which all the states have. 
The criteria for issuing the licenses are most important. 
Where the access will be restricted and some 
participants may be excluded, the constitutionality of the 
limited entry program will turn on how the licenses are 
allocated among applicants. In the Alaska limited entry 
program, allocation priorities are set by considering the 
degree of economic dependence on the fishery, the extent 
of past participation in the fishery, and the present 
ability and intent to participate in the fishery. (A.S. sec. 
16.43.200). Such a system should satisfy due process and 
equal protection. Although lotteries or auctions of 
licenses are fa.ir, they are also arbitrary and bear no 
relation to the: purpose of the statute and would probably 
not be satisfactory allocation methods for equal protection. 
In addition, if a limited number of licenses is 
issued the license itself will have a value, representing 
the value of the right to fish. The program should clearly 
address the issue of this value. The program must specify 
two things. The first is whether and how the license can 
be transferred. The license should not be available to 
non-participants in the fishery since this would lead to 
speculation in obtaining licenses. It is also not related 
to the legislative purpose of the program. Additionally, 
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there should be limits on how many licenses any single 
person or business could hold, to protect against monopoly 
(several states have anti-monopoly provisions). Licenses 
should be transferred, if at all, only through the management 
agency, with specific standards and controls clearly out-
lined as to the number of licenses any one participant 
could hold. The second point which the program must specify 
is whether the license can be attached by creditors of the 
holder. Most states exempt the tools of a debtor's trade 
from attachment. This is in keeping with a policy of 
limited alienability and with a legislative purpose of 
protecting the fishing industry and the fishermen. 
(B) All the states authorize the issuance of 
licenses for vessels. Only New Jersey has express authori-
zation to limit the number of licenses,4 although this 
could be implied in other states from the power to manage 
/as in I (Bl7. However, limiting the number of licenses 
creates a property value, the nature of which is unclear, 
and it may, therefore, be unwise to attempt to initiate a 
limited entry licensing program by administrative regulation 
alone. It would be beyond the administrative power to 
define the property attributes of these new licenses. Such 
a program would require legislative action. 
(C) FCMA allows the use of permits or licenses 
under Section 303 b (1) and limited entry under Section 303 b 
(6).5 
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V. STOCK CERTIFICATES OR FISHERMEN QUOTAS 
(A) The stock certificate program, rather than 
licensing vessels or persons, divides the available harvest 
into shares and distributes the shares to the fishermen. 
Each fisherman gets his own quota, or stock certificate, 
representing the percentage of the harvest to which he 
is entitled. The management agency must have authority 
to set an overall quota, and devise an equitable system for 
allocating the shares among competing participants. 
The problem in allocating quotas is similar to that 
in the licensing scheme. Equal protection must be satisfied 
in creating standards for deciding what allocations will be 
permitted to which participants. A system based on 
participation in or dependence upon the fishery to determine 
the class of eligible entrants would be appropriate. Shares 
would have to be divided on the basis of size of vessel, or 
possibly average catch over a certain number of years in the 
past. The allocation method must not only be reasonable 
and treat all applicants fairly and equitably, but it must 
also be related to the preservation of the fishery and the 
industry, which rules out the auction and lottery. 
Transfer characteristics and status of the 
certificate with respect to debt must be assigned. This 
is a new form of property being created by the program, 
and the traits of the property must be defined. 
(B) Because this is a departure from traditional 
management practices, it is not within the scope of 
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existing management authority. It would require legislation 
in all the states. 
The legal aspects of the instrument deal with 
policy choices, not with straightforward legalities or 
illegalities. It is within the legislative power of each 
of the states and the Federal Government to enact a stock 
certificate plan. The plan is similar to leasing resource 
access rights to mineral resources but because it is unusual 
to fisheries the power tc, implement such a plan would not 
be implied in the management authority of any of the states. 
Additionally, because of the complexity of jurisdiction, 
legislation concordant with other states and the Federal 
Government would be necessary. 
(C) Although FCMA does not specifically mention 
this concept, Section 303 b (6) could appear to be worded 
broadly enough to incorporate such a concept.6 
VI. TAXES OR USER FEES 
(A) This program limits entry by charging a fee 
to use the resource which i.s high enough to discourage 
economically inefficient fishermen. While present 
management often involves paying a fee for license or a 
tax on catch, all of these fees have statutory limits set 
at a very low level. The user fee limited entry program 
would have the management agency set and vary the fee to 
encourage or discourage participation in the fishery. 
This alternative involves two levels of legal 
problems. The first concerns the validity of using the 
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taxing power for the purpose of limiting entry. If the 
Federal Government imposed such a tax, it would have to 
be uniformly applied throughout the United States. 7 
In addition to geographical uniformity, federal taxation 
must have uniformity 9f subject matter. The tax would 
have to describe the surf clam fishery in a manner to 
satisfy this requirement.8 The federal taxing power is 
intended to raise revenues, but taxes with highly regulatory 
motives and little revenue raising ends have been upheld.9 
A limited entry tax with the revenue raising purpose of 
supporting fishery management could probably stand. 
If a state should impose this kind of tax, it 
might be struck down as too great an imposition on inter-
state commerce. 10 However, state taxes with predominately 
regulatory motives have been upheld (where the commerce 
question was not involved). Recently the Supreme Court 
upheld a city tax which had the effect of putting private 
parking lot operators out of business. 11 The Court said 
it was within the power of the city to impose "a discouraging 
tax rate," and there was no constitutional bar to the city 
putting "the automobile parker to the choice of using 
other transportation or paying the increased tax." Thus, 
if the subject matter is within the state's police power, 
it appears that the state can impose a high regulatory tax. 
There are two potential legal thories for 
challenging a limited entry tax. The first alleges a 
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deprivation of due process because the tax effectively 
destroys property by making it economically impossible to 
stay in busines:s. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected 
attacks on taxes on this theory. 12 
The s:econd theory alleges discrimination on the 
basis of ability to pay in violation of the equal protection 
clause. Under this theory a claimant asserts that the 
effect of the tax is to exclude fishing units unable to 
pay and tha.t distinguishing in allocation of government 
benefits on the wealth of the recipients violates the 
Constitution. There is some authority for saying that classi-
fication based on wealth is inherently suspect 13and 
requiresstrict judicial scrutiny. This would mean the 
statute would be valid only if necessary to further a 
compelling state interest a.nd if it was the least drastic 
means of achieving the goal. The limited entry tax, however, 
is unlike prior wealth classification cases, for the prior 
cases all dealt with express Constitutional guarantees 
sue h as suffrage, and right to counsel. Where these 
fundamental rights were limited on the basis of wealth, 
the Court was willing to say equal protection was violated. 
The right to fish is not a right of the magnitude of these 
expressed Constitutional guarantees. So far the Court has 
declined to extend the concept that discrimination by 
wealth violates equal protection beyond areas where funda-
mental rights were infringed. It has allowed wealth-
based discrimination in the funding of public schools, 14 
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in distribution of welfare benefits, 15 and in housing. 16 
The Court's record indicates that, although an equal 
protection theory could be formulated, absent holding that 
the right to fi.sh was a fundamental right under the 
Constitution, i.t is unlikely that a limited entry tax 
scheme would be struck down under the equal protection 
17 
clause. 
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ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS FOR MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT 
AND IMPLEMENTATION 
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Managi~ment programs may be developed and implemented 
with varying opportunities for success, by individual states, 
by mutual agreement among states involved in the fishery, 
by mutual agreement among states and the Federal Government, 
or by the Federal Government alone. Many variations exist for 
development and implementation. For example, it is possible 
to develop management plans through one mechanism (state, 
interstate, state-federal or federal) and implement the 
management plan by an entirely different mechanism. 
Under FCMA, management plans are developed through 
a state-federal mechanism and implemented by federal regu-
lation. State jurisdiction in internal water are not sub-
ject to preemption under Section 306 (b) (1) (B) of FCMA. 
Section 306 (b) (1) and (b) (2) of FCMA allows preemption 
of state jurisdiction in territorial seas only under limited 
. 1 
circumstances. 
Because jurisdiction under FCMA exist, as a general 
rule only in the FCZ, a species could be subject to a manage-
ment plan developed and implemented under FCMA and also 
subject to state or interstate plans directed at management 
in internal and territorial waters. Since FCMA does not 
preclude the existence or development of other regulatory 
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mechanisms, the implications of various alternatives for 
management dE~velopment and implementation will be examined 
in the following sections. 
Unilateral Governmental Development and Imple-
mentation. Unilateral development and implementation of a 
management program could occur at the state level or at the 
federal level. 
State Development: and Implementation 
Each state may develop and implement its own 
individual management program. However, jurisdiction would 
exist only in state internal waters and territorial seas 
and over state citizens and vessels on the high seas. Juris-
diction over nonresident fishing effort beyond state terri-
torial waters would be nonexistent. In a situation where each 
state implements a different management program (or imple-
ments no program), effective comprehensive management of the 
surf clam resource would be impossible. 
Federal Development and Implementation 
A Constitutional basis exists for complete federal 
regulation of resources such as the surf clam. Although 
exclusive federal jurisdiction would solve problems of 
uniformity and enforcement associated with individual or 
cooperative multi-state attempts at management or limited 
federal jurisdiction under FCMA, the total preemption of 
traditional state authority in this area would be politi-
cally unpalatablE~ in the states and questionable in 
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terms of be:ing the best possible approach to management. 
Intergovernmental Cooperation. By definition, 
intergovernmental cooperation involves at least two states 
or a state and the Federal Government. (Effective surf clam 
management would, however, require considerably more than 
cooperation between two states or one state and the Federal 
Government). Intergovernmental cooperation can be categorized 
as interstate (i.e., cooperation between two or more states) 
or state-federal (i.e., cooperation between a state or states 
and the Federal Government - the plan development process 
under FCMA). Cooperation can range from casual consultation 
or agreement to formal compacts requiring the approval 
of State and Federal Governments. Federal taxing and spend-
ing powers can also serve to facilitate intergovernmental 
cooperation. The development and implementation of a manage-
ment program requires a consideration of the effectiveness and 
ramifications of varying degrees of intergovernmental co-
operation. 
The Law of Interstate Agreements 
Federal Law. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of 
the United States Constitution states that any agreement 
between states is subject to congressional consent. In spite 
of what appears to be the clear intent of the language, the 
law at the present time is unclear as to when states must 
obtain congressional consent. In fact, many basic legal 
issues pertaining to interstate agreements are unsettled. 2 
134 
Judicial pronouncements on the necessity of congressional 
consent have ranged from a broad interpretation covering any 
agreement -··written, verbal, formal or informal 3--to a 
restricted interpretation requiring consent only when the 
agreement affects the balance of political power between 
the states and the Federal Government.4 It has also been 
argued that the modern cooperative form of agreement is 
entirely outside the meaning of the compact clause of the 
constitution as it was originally intended and, accordingly, 
no congressional consent is necessary for agreements of this 
nature. 5 
The necessity of consent can raise many procedural 
and substantive problems. Congressional consent may cause 
a delay of months or possibly of a year or more. Congress 
may impose conditions on the giving of consent. It should 
also be notE~d that although congressional consent is 
usually given in a provision of an act or by joint resolution, 
it may be inferred. 6 Congress, in an attempt to encourage 
interstate coopeiration, has enacted into law provisions 
granting advance consent for agreements concerning certain 
subjects. 
Also unclear are the legal implications of 
congressional consent. It has been held that the construction 
or interpretation of a compact or agreement sanctioned by 
Congress under the compact clause would be a federal question. 7 
The primary issue :ts whether congressional consent raises 
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the status of the compact or agreement to the status of a 
federal law. Recent court decisions seem to endorse this 
concept although most authorities hold the "Law of the 
Union Doctrine," as it is called, in contempt. Under this 
doctrine it has been held that congressional consent raised 
the status of the compact or agreement to that of federal 
law and the compact or agreement would be binding on a 
state in spite of state constitutional restriction or other 
8 
state law to the contrary. It has also been held that 
a compact could be interpreted contrary to the intention 
of the states and the state would be bound by this interpreta-
tion.9 If a compact or agreement has the status of a federal 
statute, this may affect rights of amendment, repeal, and 
withdrawal. It should also be noted that a state-federal 
agreement or compact almost certainly necessitates congressional 
consent or legislation. Such a compact or agreement would, in 
all probability, be considered to have the status of federal 
law. 
~tate Law. As a general rule state legislatures 
are vested with the authority to enter into interstate 
compacts or agreements on behalf of the state. When this 
power is vested solely within·the legislature, many of the 
same procedural and substantive problems associated with 
the necessity for Congressional consent can be found at 
the state level. Depending on constitutional and statutory 
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construction, it may or may not be possible for the legis-
lature to delegate the power to enter into interstate 
agreement to governmental entities at the department or 
agency level. In many cases where delegation of authority 
has been made, the extent of the power granted has been 
clouded by ambiguous language, conflicting practice, or 
agency reluctance to act to the full extent of the power 
granted. 
Interstate GoopE~ration 
Two or more states can cooperate on a formal or 
informal basis ranging from casual consultation to binding 
compacts. Effective management would require a binding 
agreement between states to commit themselves to the 
adoption and enforcement of a uniform management plan. 
Existj:!l&_ Management Vehicles. A vehicle for 
interstate cooperation already exists in the form of the 
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact. Under Amend-
ment I to this interstate compact, states may delegate regula-
tory authority to the ASMFC. The limits of such authority, 
however, are open to question and, of the five states 
involved in the surf clam fishery only two, Virginia and 
New Jersey have ratified Amendment I enabling the ASMFC 
to act as a regulatory body. Absent the powers granted by 
Amendment I, thei ASMFC can only function in a recommenda-
tory capacity. 
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If no existing interstate agreement is suitable 
as a management vehicle, then another mechanism for co-
operation must be developed. Entry into any such agree-
ment calling for interstate cooperation would, in most 
instances, require dealing with problems of state legislative 
consent and almost certainly Congressional consent. (Un-
fortunately conclusive statements regarding requirement of 
Congressional consent and its implications are impossible 
to make at the present time due to the unsettled nature of 
the law on those points. 
State-Federal Cooperation 
Another alternative means of development and 
implementation, in addition to unilateral or interstate 
action, is state-federal cooperation. This can be of a 
formal or informal nature. Many avenues for such an approach 
already exist. The State-Federal Program, ASMFC, and most 
recently FCMA are major examples of existing institution 
providing means for state-federal cooperation. 
Perhaps the most significant alternative for 
state-federal cooperation is direct federal participation 
in agreements of an interstate nature. However, other 
means of state-federal cooperation exist in addition to 
direct federal participation in interstate compacts or 
agreements and some are more feasible than others in the 
context of fisheries management. For example, state-federal 
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cooperation can be fostered through federal exercise of 
the spending power specifically enumerated in the constitution. 
Under authority of the spending power, grants to states could 
be conditioned on state compliance with certain policy goals. 
Although not as attractive as federal grants, another alterna-
tive would be the use of the federal taxing power to induce 
state cooperation and to achieve policy goals. Given the 
appropriate legislative structure, management goals could 
be fostered by delegations of federal power to the state, 
state adoption of federal regulatory criteria or federal 
implementation of state or state-federal plans. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Management DevE:!lopment and Implementation 
FCMA provides for state-federal cooperation in 
the development of management plans and federal implementation 
of the plan. Plans developed under FCMA are generally 
limited to the FCZ. State authority in internal waters 
is not subject to federal preemption under FCMA. Pre-
emption of state jurisdiction in territorial seas is 
possible under limited circumstances. Within internal 
waters and territorial seas state, interstate, or state-
federal alternatives for management development and 
implementation remain possible. If however, lack of an 
effective management mechanism in state waters thwarts 
overall resource management, federal preemption is possible. 
Alternative Management Schemes 
Only the user tax, of all the proposed schemes, 
would be impermissable under FCMA. In the context 
of state regulation in internal waters and territorial 
seas, each scheime must be independently evaluated according 
to the current status of the law in question in each state. 
